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STUDENT ARTICLES
A COERCION DEFENSE FOR THE STREET GANG
CRIMINAL: PLUGGING THE MORAL GAP IN
EXISTING LAW
DAVID S. RUTKOWSKI*
[L]aw is ineffective in the deepest sense, indeed it is
hypocritical, if it imposes on the actor who has the misfor-
tune to confront a dilemmatic choice, a standard that his
judges are not prepared to affirm that they should and
could comply with if their turn to face the problem should
arise. Condemnation in such a case . . . is divorced from
any moral base and is unjust.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Crime in society is an unquestioned problem threatening
social and moral communities where it occurs. 2 Recent percep-
tion of increase has lead to significant legislative measures to dis-
courage and, when unsuccessful, to incapacitate criminals.'
Unjust combat, however, weakens the society it purports to
* A.B., 1993, Stanford University;J.D. Candidate, 1996, Notre Dame Law
School; Thomas J. White Scholar, 1994-96. The author wishes to thank
Professor John Robinson for his helpful comments on drafts of this article.
1. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374-75 (1985)
[hereinafter MPC].
2. See Alan C. Brantley & Andrew DiRosa, Gangs: A National Perspective,
F.B.I. LAw ENFORCEMENT BULL., May 1994, at 1 ("Today, gangs represent a
serious threat to the Nation's sense of security." Id. at 2).
3. E.g., mandatory sentencing, "three-strikes-and-you're-out" legislation,
and RICO. For a discussion of mandatory sentencing, see Gary T. Lowenthal,
Mandatoy Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing
Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61 (1993). Federal "three-strikes-and-you're-out"
legislation is found at 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (1994) (two convictions for "violent"
felonies requires a mandatory life sentence without parole). For a discussion of
existing state "three-strikes-and-you're-out" legislation, see Robert Heglin, Note,
A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: "Three Strikes and You're Out," 20J. LEGIS.
213, 215-16 (1994). RICO is found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).
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defend.4 To maintain social and moral community, punishment
for crime must accurately reflect the culpability of the actor. To
help unite the measure of punishment with the degree of culpa-
bility, the criminal law recognizes a number of affirmative
defenses that may justify or excuse otherwise criminal acts when
the exigencies of the situation require.
In particular, gang crime5 and membership6 are on the
increase and have met considerable response from legislatures
and prosecutors alike - both in theories of prosecution and in
unique criminal counts. Several state legislatures have enacted
various anti-gang statutes to combat the proliferation of gangs
and gang crime.' With the development of these measures, the
goal of just punishment should not be forgotten. If punishment
is inflicted independent of culpability, the practice of punish-
ment suffers as does the authority of society to administer it.8
Society must punish gang members only to the extent of their
culpability. To facilitate this match, even gang members should
not be overlooked as potential victims of crime whose victimiza-
tion may mitigate or completely negate culpability for otherwise
criminal acts.
4. See David Bazelon, The Morality of Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REv. 385,
386 (1976) ("[L]aw's aims must be achieved by a moral process cognizant of
the realities of social injustice.").
5. 140 CONG. REC. S15270 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Paul Simon); CATmINE H. CONLY, STREET GANGS: CuRRENT KNOWLEDGE AND
STRATEGIES 1, 12-13, 27 (1993) (included in "crime" are both property crimes
and crimes against people); C. Ronald Huff, Youth Gangs and Public Policy, 35
CIME & DELINQ. 524, 524 (1989); David W. Thompson & Leonard A. Jason,
Street Gangs & Preventive Interventions, 15 CRam. JusT. & BEHAV. 323, 324 (1988).
6. Paul Cromwell et al., Youth Gangs: A 1990's Perspective, 43 Juv. & FAM.
CT.J. 25, 25 (Sum. 1992).
7. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2308(F), 13-3102(A)(9) (Supp. 1995);
Arkansas Criminal Gang, Organization, or Enterprise Act, AR. CODE ANN. §§ 5-
74-101 to -105 (Michie 1993); California Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-.28 (West Supp. 1995); Street
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 874.01-.08
(West 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-1 to -7 (1992 & Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 740, paras. 147/1-35, ch. 705, para. 405/5-4(3.1)-(3.3), ch. 730, para.
5/5-5-3(c) (2) () (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-9-1 to -4
(Bums 1994 & Supp. 1995); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 723A.1-.2 (West 1993);
Louisiana Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act, LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 15.1401-.1407 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229
(West Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 578.421-.437 (Vernon 1995); NEv. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 193.168 (Michie 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 856 (West
Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFMD LAWS ANN. §§ 22-10-14 to -15 (Supp. 1995).
8. See infra notes 156-95 and accompanying text.
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Gangs and gang crime pose an extraordinary threat to soci-
ety at large;' in gang-controlled communities, they can exert
almost ubiquitous authority."° In prosecuting gang members for
their gang related crimes, the criminal justice system should not
forget that these members, before they join, help compose the
larger "terrorized" society and often reside in the most afflicted
communities." It is against the social backdrop and policy goals
that influenced anti-gang legislation that we must evaluate the
moral culpability of criminal gang acts and actors.
California's anti-gang legislation opens: "[Ilt is the right of
every person ... to be secure and protected from fear, intimida-
tion, and physical harm caused by the activities of violent groups
and individuals." 2 Since gang members pervade "innocent"
society before they join, we cannot summarily discount the possi-
bility that society's failure to secure their safety, suggested as a
"right" in the California statute, precipitated such association.
Specifically, that society may have failed its duty is relevant in
determining whether a gang member lacked free choice in join-
ing his"3 gang. Additionally, -once within the gang, an individual
member is not always free to choose to participate or not partici-
pate in various gang activities, nor is he always completely at lib-
erty to leave.
The critical question that this Article will address is whether
a person is morally accountable forjoining a gang to help secure
9. See, e.g., Tracey Kaplan, A Stray Bullet Kills Resident Who Stood Up to the
Gangs, LA. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1992, at 3 (man shot while trying to expel a graffiti
artist when rival gang members arrived and opened fire). See also C. Ronald
Huff, The New Youth Gangs: Social Policy and Malignant Neglect, in JUVENILE
JUSTICE & PUBLIC POLICY 20, 27-28 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992) (there are nearly
500 gang-related homicides in Los Angeles each year, roughly one-half of the
victims are not gang members).
10. See CONLY, supra note 5, at 7-9. Although Conly's compilation of
research on gang neighborhoods suggests that some gangs maintain a positive
relationship with their host community in order to retain a certain level of
community tolerance, she also notes that other, more violent gangs, tend to
play more controlling roles. Id.
11. Id.; Bazelon, supra note 4, at 402. Cf G. David Curry & Irving A.
Spergel, Gang Homicide, Delinquency, and Community, 26 CIMINOLOGY 381, 385
(1988) (high crime areas do not significantly vary across Chicago
neighborhoods).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West Supp. 1995).
13. Gang members will be referred to in the masculine throughout. This
is primarily for writing convenience, however it also is representative of the
gender composition of most gangs. Male gang members exist in far greater
number than female gang members and the two almost never mix within any
one gang. See CONLY, supra note 5, at 14; Cromwell et al., supra note 6, at 27;
Huff, supra note 9, at 21; John W. Williams, Jr., Understanding How Youth Gangs
Operate, CORRECTIONS TODAY, July 1992, at 86, 86.
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his safety when society has failed its threshold responsibility to
protect and, as a part of such gang association, is compelled to
further the gang's activities or commit criminal acts. Insofar as a
person lacked free choice in joining a gang, to that extent he
should not be held morally responsible for involuntary acts
within the gang and should not be punished; insofar as his capac-
ity for free choice was diminished but not removed, his punish-
ment should be reduced proportionately. Existing law is not
equipped to address these contentions adequately. This Article
will discuss various factors that can lead to gang participation and
criminal activity within the gang and posit that a coercion-based
defense should be available to excuse gang actors in appropriate
situations.
The presentation will proceed as follows. Part II will present
gang culture in an almost anthropological vein. Most people are
unfamiliar with gang operations and structure and why gang
membership is so popular. A thorough explanation is imperative
for understanding why classic defenses do not adequately address
the "insider" victims of this increasing problem. Although this
discussion will not be exhaustive, as understanding of gangs is
ever changing and increasing as gangs themselves change, it will
suffice to expose the type of gang members relevant to the cen-
tral issue in this Article.14
In particular, Part II will define gang, gang membership,
and gang related crime. The viability of concretely defining
these terms is the cause of considerable uncertainty in gang
research15 and has important implications for assessing and
addressing gang problems. Part II will discuss various gang struc-
tures and leadership forms. This structure is particularly impor-
tant in evaluating the activities of gang members and the capacity
of the gang to threaten and coerce. Expanding on the various
gang environments, coercive influences leading to gang involve-
ment will also be examined. Finally, Part II will discuss the
restrictions that certain gangs and gang controlled communities
place on the activities of their members and the ability of their
members to quit safely.
The Article, then, will briefly switch to a theoretical discus-
sion of the basis for punishment. Part III will examine the pro-
priety of criminal punishment in the abstract and as applied to
14. For more thorough discussions of street gangs, current as of this
publication, see MALcoLM W. KLEIN, THE AMERICAN STREET GANG (1995);
IRVING A. SPERGEL, THE YouTm GANG PROBLEM (1995).
15. Cromwell et al., supra note 6, at 26 ("gang" labeling is usually self-
serving, defined for a particular purpose by the police, media, or political
bodies).
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coercion defenses in general. The crux of this discussion is that
a coerced gang member is like any other coerced person and is
equally undeserving of punishment. Instead, it is the coercive
force or person that is the proper subject of public censure.
Returning to specific application, Part IV probes the particu-
lars of the classic defense of duress, while, at the same time, con-
templating circumstances in which it is morally unjust to punish
gang members for their criminal acts.16 Recognizing potential
compelling scenarios, Part IV also explores the void in existing
law for addressing these situations.
Finally, recognizing the moral strength of certain exculpa-
tory claims, Part V will develop a structured coercion defense
framed primarily by the classic excuse of duress. Part V will
examine the elements of this defense, their justifications and
applications, and various difficulties this defense must survive.
Specifically, this new defense faces obstacles in practical applica-
tion as well as perception and acceptance problems from society.
None, however, overwhelm the justice requirement that should
be the goal of criminal law. Crime control has not yet reached
the point where moral innocents should be punished to decrease
the armament of coercive gangs.
II. STREET GANGS
A. What is a Gang And Who Are Its Members?
It is important to define a gang,17 who its members are, and
what are gang activities. More specifically, society must define
what it is prepared to recognize as such. Clearly, there is no con-
sensus." Almost all academic studies about gangs and gang
activity employ variant definitions for these terms.1 9 To add to
16. The skeletal scenario exists where a member lacked free choice in
joining a gang and, once a member, lacked free choice in remaining a member
and in acting or refusing to act according to the gang's directives. See infra
notes 217-24 and accompanying text.
17. Youth "gangs" often use other names to define themselves, such as
posse, tribe, or crew; this nomenclature is not important, the underlying
characteristics that band these groups are the operative factors.
18. CONLY, supra note 5, at 5. See also Ruth Horowitz, Sociological
Perspectives on Gangs: Conflicting Definitions and Concepts, in GANGS IN AMERICA 37,
43 (C. Ronald Huff ed., 1990) ("every group... has its own interests and taken-
for-granted assumptions and will never agree on a definition.").
19. See, e.g., CorNav, supra note 5, at 5-6 (presenting six different
conceptions of "gang" that researchers use); Huff, supra note 9, at 25; James R.
Lasley, Age, Social Context, and Street Gang Membership: Are "Youth" Gangs Becoming
"Adult" Gangs?, 23 YouTH & Soc'v 434, 439 (1992); Leonard Savitz et al.,
Delinquency and Gang Membership As Related to Victimization, 5 VIcrrMoLOGy 152,
154 (1982).
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the mix, the popular media are likely to expand artificially the
scope of gang activity to dramatize their stories.2 ° Although no
one definition is necessarily correct, some are better than others.
The primary vice of these variant definitions is that they produce
conflicting gang data sets.21 Where one definition finds a gang
another may not. When Cheryl L. Maxson and Malcolm W.
Klein applied the relatively restrictive definition of "gang-related"
used by the Chicago Police Department to "gang-related" Los
Angeles homicide data, they found that the gang homicide rate
in Los Angeles would be cut in half.22 An important lesson,
therefore, to remember throughout the following discussion of
gangs, forms, and functions is that information about gangs can-
not easily pass from one area or study to the next; systematic
understanding is limited. This does not mean that individual
conclusions or observations are suspect, but only that larger
trends are difficult to confirm.
Nevertheless, gang definitions play important roles in the
criminal and social treatment of "gang" members. First, the
proliferation of anti-gang statutes23 has necessitated that legisla-
tures and/or courts determine exactly whom these terms
describe. A suspect consequence is that these conclusions create
greater penalties for "gang" members than for solo criminal
actors. Second, labeling someone as a gang member may play an
important role in solidifying that person as an actual gang mem-
ber. Third, a workable definition will help to focus Part V's
development of a gang-coercion defense, although a technical
finding of "gang" presence is not morally imperative. The effects
and opportunity for coercion that may play on an individual do
not depend on whether we would like to term the coercing force
a gang. However, the recognition that ajury or judge may wish
to accord a particular claim may depend on such arbitrary
titles.2 4
20. Cromwell et al., supra note 6, at 26. See also Salvador A. Mendez,
Community Struggles to Prevent Youths From Joining Growing Numbers of Gangs,
CORRECTIONS TODAY, July 1992, at 72, 74 ("Because of the media's ignorance
and overdramatization of gang problems, the Salt Lake County community is
increasingly fearful and reactionary.").
21. Cromwell et al., supra note 6, at 27.
22. Cheryl L. Maxson & Malcolm W. Klein, Street Gang Violence: Twice as
Great, or Half as Great, in GANGS IN AMERICA, supra note 18, at 71, 73, 90.
23. See supra note 7.
24. See infra text paragraph following note 49.
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1. Definitions
Although there is no unanimous definition for "gang," legis-
latures, courts, and researchers have applied certain components
extensively. Recognizing prevalent factors from various .defini-
tions employed, in this Article a "gang" is "an ongoing, organized
association of three25 or more persons, whether formal or infor-
mal, who have a common name or common signs, colors, or sym-
bols, and members or associates who individually or collectively
engage in... criminal activity"2 6 as a part of the ordinary busi-
ness of the association. 27
In a related matter, we need some way to determine or
define gang membership. This topic has also been the subject of
uncertainty. As a gang is a relative body, depending on the defi-
nition used, no universally accepted method for determining
membership has been construed.28 Macro-level uncertainty is
caused by the difficulty researchers and others have had in defin-
ing gangs and the problems attendant to placing conclusive
labels on private individuals with disincentives to reveal their true
affiliations. At the micro-level, the selection of a particular defi-
nition of "gang" somewhat ameliorates this difficulty. Internal
consistency is possible once a group or study adopts a particular
25. The anti-gang legislation in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida,
Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Missouri, and South Dakota all specifically
require the presence of only three people to constitute a gang. The selection of
this number was, perhaps, influenced by the common law on riots, which
required the presence of at least three people for a potential riot to exist. See
MPC, supra note 1, § 250.1; 4 WLLiAm BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *146. See
also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101-02 (1994) (federal riot law). Curiously, in its anti-gang
legislation, Indiana requires the association of at least five people before the
presence of a "gang" may be found. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-9-1 (Bums Supp.
1995). This deviation from the norm may be due to the fact that Indiana
requires the presence of five people for a riot as well. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-
1-1 to -2 (Burns 1994). But see Mo. ANN. STAT. § 574.050 (Vernon 1995)
(requiring at least seven people for a riot despite the need for only three
people to form a gang).
26. CONLY, supra note 5, at 6 (represented as a "statutory definition" and
very similar to the definitions set forth in the anti-gang statutes of California,
CAL. PENAL CODE. § 186.22(f) (West Supp. 1995), and the anti-gang statutes of
other states). This definition is very similar to that found in WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DicrIONARY 555 (3d ed. 1988), which defines gangs as an organized
group of criminals or juvenile delinquents and is representative of other,
slightly variant, definitions. For similar definitions of "gang," see Lasley, supra
note 19, at 436; Mendez, supra note 20, at 75.
27. This qualification, present in some definitions, would exclude
benevolent organizations that contain criminal members. Under a literal
reading of the statutory definition, these "positive" groups would be considered
gangs subject to anti-gang legislation and to some bizarre applications of law.
28. Thompson & Jason, supra note 5, at 325.
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definition. Toward this end, police officers have identified cer-
tain factors they consider important in identifying gang
members.
Generally accepted criteria for identifying gang members
include: if an individual admits gang membership; if a very relia-
ble informant represents a person as a gang member; if a person
wears gang type clothing, has gang tattoos, or uses gang symbols
or would adorn a distinctive gang dress style to affect a certain
neighborhood; if the person is arrested in the association of
other gang members during the commission of a gang crime; if
an unreliable or untested informant represents a person as a
gang member and that identification is corroborated by other
criteria. 9 At the margin of this definition, if a person is continu-
ally in the association or within the group of gang members but
does not fit the other criteria, he may be considered an associate
and not a gang member." Although guidance from these fac-
tors is helpful, their efficacy has been doubted as seriously inac-
curate and unprincipled and essentially dependent on police
officers using their best judgment.3 '
With gang defined and various tools for determining mem-
bership, what, then, is "gang crime"? Demarcation of gang crime
is difficult in large part because gangs are such amorphous
groups. Given the previous definitions, it is plain that the defini-
tions for gang, gang member, and gang crime must significantly
work off one another. Obviously, to find gang crime, you first
need a gang and a criminal act committed by a member. But,
then again, the presence of a gang necessarily depends on crimi-
nal activity. And, unless there is a gang, there can be no gang
member. Gang crimes, then, are those crimes or activities that
would satisfy the respective crime requirements for the defini-
tions of gang or gang membership or that would perpetuate the
gang's interests once its existence has been confirmed.
G. David Curry and Irving A. Spergel have attempted to
define gang crime in less cyclical terms as, "law violating behavior
29. State v. Tran, 847 P.2d 680, 684 (Kan. 1993). The definition used by
the Wichita Police gang unit in Tran was adopted from that developed by the
Los Angeles police gang unit and is representative of the dominant factors used
in most studies of gang membership. See Mendez, supra note 20, at 75. These
factors have also been adopted in the anti-gang statutes of both Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 874.03(2) (West 1994), and South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 22-10-14(2) (Supp. 1995), and to a lessor extent in Arizona's anti-gang
legislation, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(8) (Supp. 1995).
30. Tran, 847 P.2d at 684. For an explanation of the difference between a
gang member and an associate, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
31. Thompson &Jason, supra note 5, at 325.
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committed... in or related to groups that are complexly organ-
ized although sometimes diffuse, sometimes cohesive with estab-
lished leadership and membership roles.""2 Curry and Spergel's
definition and the definition presented in the immediately pre-
ceding paragraph are not significantly different.
To some extent, the difficulty of determining what consti-
tutes gang crime has been ameliorated in California, Louisiana,
Minnesota, and Missouri by provisions in their respective anti-
gang statutes. These states have simply enumerated which
crimes are eligible to be branded gang crimes. When an enu-
merated crime is committed by a gang member it is automatically
a gang crime; regardless of the involvement of any gang in the
commission. This does seem to tidy up the definition of gang
crime, however, its application is no less dependent on the defi-
nitions used for gang and gang membership and the uncertain-
ties these create.
2. Definition Has Important Criminal and Psychological
Implications
Although defining gangs, gang members, and gang crime
may seem purely academic, it is not. Indeed, it is more danger-
ous in the criminal justice system to be a gang member than a
solitary criminal. Besides its value in framing the eligible class of
defendants for a new coercion defense that will be described in
Part V, definition is paramount in determining who can be pros-
ecuted under anti-gang statutes; in certain cases, this definition
can even influence who, in fact, becomes a gang member.
Within most anti-gang legislation 3 are provisions that hinge
culpability and enhanced punishment on definitions of gangs,
gang membership, and gang crime. For example, California has
enacted its California Street Terrorism Enforcement and Preven-
tion Act (STEP Act) which makes it a crime knowingly to partici-
pate in a criminal street gang34 and provides for sentence
enhancements for gang related crimes.3 5 There are also private
32. Curry & Spergel, supra note 11, at 382.
33. For a thorough analysis of anti-gang legislation from which the
following discussion, infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text, has benefited
greatly, see Michael D. Finley, Note, Anti-Gang Legislation: How Much Will it
Take?, 14J.JuvENnE L. 47 (1993). See also David R Truman, Note, The Jets and
Sharks are Dead: State Statutoiy Responses to Criminal Street Gangs, 73 WASH. U. L.Q.
683 (1995).
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West Supp. 1995) (punishable by up to
three years imprisonment).
35. Id. § 186.22(b) (additional consecutive term of one to three years on
felonies not punishable by life or two to four years if the crime is committed
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nuisance provisions providing for injunctions and for assessing
personal liability to abate gang violence.36 These provisions have
passed various Constitutional challenges in California, 7 includ-
ing claimed infringement on freedom of association.31 Califor-
nia's STEP Act has served as a model for various other states
enacting similar punitive measures.3 9
Illinois' "gang transfer" statute is an alternative approach to
gang violence. 4' Essentially this statute allows the state to prose-
cute a juvenile offender in the adult system provided: he is over
age fifteen; he has a prior record of what would amount to forci-
ble felonies; the current charge would be a forcible felony; and,
the offense furthered the criminal activities of an organized
gang.41 Illinois statute also provides that convictions for gang
related forcible felonies require jail sentences.42 Like its Califor-
nia counterpart, the Illinois statutes have passed Constitutional
muster.43 However, unlike California's STEP Act, the Illinois
provisions have not yet inspired emulation.
In many states that have not enacted anti-gang provisions,
gang crimes are being prosecuted more aggressively than non-
gang related offenses.' Additionally, federal law has provided a
mighty sword. Prosecutors have used the Federal Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to indict and
to convict gang members for their gang related crimes.43
within 1,000 feet of a school during school hours; in the case of life sentences
this section requires that the offender complete at least fifteen years before
being eligible for parole).
36. Id. § 186.22a.
37. In re Alberto R., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (due process
and equal protection); People v. Green, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
(vague and overbroad terms).
38. Alberto R, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 357.
39. Finley, supra note 33, at 54-55 n.68 (Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana);
Truman, supra note 33, at 688 n.28 (Missouri). Too a lesser extent, Arizona,
Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, and South Dakota have, at least,
implemented enhanced penalty provisions similar to California's STEP Act.
Finley, supra note 33, at 54-55 n.69.
40. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 705, paras. 405/5-4(3.1)-(3.3) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1995).
41. Finley, supra note 33, at 49.
42. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 5/5-5-3(c) (2) (J) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1995).
43. See People v. P.H., 582 N.E.2d 700 (Ill. 1991) (separation of powers,
double-jeopardy, equal protection, substantive due process, vagueness, and
procedural due process challenges all rejected).
44. Finley, supra note 33, at 55.
45. See, e.g., United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied sub nom. Kelly v. United States, 503 U.S. 941 (1992); United States v.
Boyd, 792 F. Supp. 1083 (N.D. Il. 1992). See also Matthew Purdy, Using the
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In addition, it cannot be ignored that for some "gang" mem-
bers on the periphery of gang involvement, labeling or over-
labeling them as gang members may help solidify their involve-
ment in the gang.4 C. Ronald Huff explained this phenomenon
with reference to the protective function of gangs.47 An individ-
ual gang provides some measure of protection against rival gangs
for its members4" - a service often unavailable from other, legit-
imate resources. If a youth is labeled as a gang member or is
associated with a particular gang, he may need this protection,
but it will be available only if he actually becomes a member. In
such a position, the youth would need to join the gang with which
he has been associated, if only for protection from rival gangs.
49
Finally, a gang member must contend with both perception
and reception by both judge and jury. To argue the new coer-
cion defense presented in this Article, the defendant will neces-
sarily need to convince either a judge or jury or both that the
coercive forces acting were sufficient to exculpate an otherwise
criminal act. That it was a "gang" that coerced the defendant
could lend weight to the seriousness and pervasiveness of the
threats the defendant faced. On the other hand, society's appre-
hension of gangs and the general trend toward crime control
through stiffer penalties representative of the "war on crime"
could increase the fear factor involved. The jury may wish to err
on the side of false positives - better to convict all gang mem-
bers, even those acting under coercive force, than to acquit a
dangerous gang member or allow gang violence to pass with
impunity. This negative sentiment that is directed toward gang
defendants is different from that associated with other coerced
defendants. Whereas the typical coerced defendant is exposed
to an unreasonable threat that compels an otherwise "normal"
citizen to commit a crime, the gang member is (at least nomi-
nally) a part of the criminal group; gang crime is not an isolated
incident and the gang member defendant is, to a certain degree,
a part of the coercive force itself.
Racketeering Law to Bring Down Street Gangs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1994, at Al;
Michael York, Five Convicted in R Street Drug Trial. Racketeering Law Used to
Prosecute D.C. Gang Leaders, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1993, at Al. For a broad
discussion of the efficacy and propriety of RICO's application to street gangs, see
generally Lesley Suzanne Bonney, Comment, The Prosecution of Sophisticated Urban
Street Gangs: A Proper Application of RICO, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 579 (1993).
46. CONLY, supra note 5, at 49-50; Huff, supra note 9, at 27.
47. For a discussion of the protective function of gangs, see infra notes
68-85, 150-55 and accompanying text.
48. Huff, supra note 9, at 22; Savitz et al., supra note 19, at 153.
49. Huff, supra note 9, at 27.
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Given the various statutory provisions, theories of prosecu-
tion, and psychological "gang" factors, it is important to label
correctly particular actors and acts as gang involved. These statu-
tory provisions, their effectiveness, and anti-crime/anti-gang per-
ceptions are not, however, determinative of the moral culpability
of individual gang actors.
B. Structure And Leadership: How Gangs Operate
Defining gangs and gang members gives little substance to
these categories. Discussion of the operations of gangs and moti-
vations of gang members is necessary to an informed evaluation
of the activities of individual gang members. Clearly, gangs
maintains some level of control over the activities of their mem-
bers. The level of this control will depend, in part, on the organi-
zational and leadership structure adopted by the gang.
Gangs can take almost any form. So long as they fit into the
prescribed definition, form is variable. The dominant thought in
gang structure study is that gangs are rather disorganized, com-
posed of various numbers of groups loosely associated into dif-
fuse organizations.5" This view, however, is not universal.
Indeed, it reveals only that a majority of gangs may organize in
this manner, not that this is the only form. Other studies find
more elaborate structure and cohesive decision making bodies.
Since the study of the structure of loose associations is difficult
and the likely coercive power minimal in such cases, we will con-
sider primarily those gangs exhibiting significant structure.
Within the larger species of organized gangs, there is no one
correct structure that a gang must take. According to Martin
S~inchez Jankowski's study of New York, Boston, and Los Angeles
gangs, three organizational structures predominate.51 First, the
vertical or hierarchical form recognizes leadership divided into
various offices in a traditional pyramid of descending power.
Second, is the horizontal or commission form in which all lead-
ers share equal power over lower members. These two forms
carry the greatest potential for coercive force. The final form is
termed the influential form in which two to four members are
informally recognized as leaders of the gang and exert lesser
influence over common members. Many gangs change between
these and other less popular leadership structures frequently
50. MARTtN SANCHEZ JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET: GANGS AND
AMERICAN URBAN SOCIETY 63 (1991); Leslie W. Kennedy & Stephen W. Baron,
Routine Activities and a Subculture of Violence: A Study of Violence on the Street, 30 J.
RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 88, 91 (1993).
51. JANKOWSKI, supra note 50, at 64-67.
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depending on their composition and needs at any one time."
Although this structure may routinely change, the gang must
select some form in order to exist as a coherent group. __
Size may help select which of these structures a gang will
adopt. Toward this end, traditional organization theory offers
some advice. Specifically, the larger the organization, the greater
the need for structure of some sort.53 To reiterate, the larger the
gang the more formal the structure and the more power gang
leadership must possess. This structure restricts the decision
making authority of low level actors and leaves these low level
"workers" limited ability to change the directives or goals of the
organization.
On an intermediate scale, within any one gang there are
often many "cliques" composed of a portion of the members who
consistently act in concert.5 4 These cliques are semiautonomous
and coordinate to various degrees with the other cliques from
the same gang. The presence of cliques is more frequent in
larger gangs that maintain bases of power in several cities or sev-
eral areas within a particular city, regardless of the chosen or cur-
rent leadership structure.
At the personal level, individual gang members separate into
several power units. Although these units merely comprise the
various groups described above, the terminology will facilitate
later reference. Prevalent understanding consolidates gang
members into three groups: leaders (a.k.a. hard-core gang mem-
bers, O.G. (original gangsters), core members, or homeboys),
peripheral members (a.k.a. associates), and recruits.55 Leaders are
typically violent criminals, very active and committed to the gang,
and compose roughly fifty percent of most gangs.56 Peripheral
members know people in the gang but are not deeply associated
with the people or the activities.5 7 These members, however, are
called on to participate in the activities of the gang and are con-
sidered a part of the group. Recruits are new or potential mem-
bers whose roles are yet uncertain.58 An additional group,
52. In an appendix to Jankowski's book, he summarizes the leadership
structure of 37 different gangs of which over two-thirds had changed leadership
structures during the period of his study. Id. app. at 323-324.
53. See W. RiCHARD Sco-r, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL, AND
OPEN SYSTEMS 245 (2d ed. 1987) (size of administrative component increases
with organization size).
54. CONLY, supra note 5, at 9-10.
55. Id. at 9; Williams, supra note 13, at 86.
56. CONLY, supra note 5, at 9 (citing Malcolm W. Klein's studies of gangs
in California).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 19 (research on recruiting is limited).
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although not technically within the gang, are wannabees (a.k.a.
peewees or juniors). Wannabees are typically young and infatu-
ated with the gang and, although they may act the role and talk
the talk, they are not gang members.59
Delimitation of gang members into neat categories helps
one to evaluate the extent of and, perhaps, motivation for actions
within the gang. This discussion, however, does not help deter-
mine why someone joins a gang in the first place or maintains
any level of involvement. These latter determinations are more
germane to the development of a coercion defense, but a prior
understanding of gang structure provides a valuable perspective
into gang activity that will be useful in assessing the validity of
coercive scenarios.
C. Why IndividualsJoin Gangs
Certainly no discussion of individual motivations can hope
to encompass all existing influences that may lead to involvement
in a gang. The discussion of factors that follows recognizes two
main categories that stimulate gang membership: personal
incentives and gang recruitment. These factors are not meant to
be exclusive; rather, they have been selected for their bearing on
the coercion discussion that will proceed in Parts IV and V,
below.
1. Personal Incentives
Researchers have recognized numerous stimulants to gang
membership. Underlying more specific motivations, many stud-
ies find poverty and alienation of urban groups as crucial factors
leading to gang involvement.' Along these lines, Irving A.
Spergel, director of the National Youth Gang Suppression and
Intervention Research and Development Program at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, cites social disorganization (specifically disorgani-
zation in the school, family, politics, and neighborhood) and
insufficient access to legitimate resources as primary factors con-
tributing to and reinforcing gang involvement.61 In a Chicago
study, Spergel notes:
The violent gang is a natural, lower-class interstitial institu-
tion, resulting mainly from the weakness of secondary insti-
tutions, such as schools, local communities, and ethnic
59. Id. at 9; Williams, supra note 13, at 86.
60. Cromwell et al., supra note 6, at 28.
61. IRVING A. SPERGEL ET AL., NATIONAL YOUTH GANG SUPPRESSION AND
INTERVENTION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, YOUTH GANGS: PROBLEMS
AND RESPONSES 8 (1990) (Executive Summary).
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organizations, and to some extent from the weakness of
primary institutions such as the family, to provide adequate
mechanisms of opportunity and social control, particularly
in the transition of males from youth to adulthood.6 2
Further, Curry and Spergel concluded, in their study of gang
membership and delinquency, that, "[s] ocial disorganization and
poverty rather than criminal organization and conspiracy may
better explain the recent growth and spread of youth gangs to
many parts of the country. "63
An alternative line of study (perhaps encompassed by
Spergel's broader scheme) suggests that many decisions to join
gangs derive from rational decision making; a member can
accomplish or access more within a gang than on his own.6 4
More specifically, the following individual factors have been con-
sistently cited as motivating gang involvement: money, economic
opportunities, previous involvement in crime, excitement,
power, status, sex, structure, belonging, recognition, dropout or
school failure, respect, understanding, growing up with values
contrary to the mainstream, discipline, self-esteem, hopelessness
of urban life, dysfunctional families, nurturing, love, shelter,
food, clothing, violence in gang youths' lives, and protection
needs.6" Although the beginning of this laundry list stokes the
prosecutorial fire raging against gang members, the final five
offerings cannot be overlooked: shelter, food, clothing, violence
in their lives, and protection needs.6 6 The first three of these
unfortunate factors are necessities of life. In some cases these
62. Irving A. Spergel, Violent Gangs in Chicago: In Search of Social Policy, 58
Soc. SERVICE REv. 199, 201-02 (1984).
63. Curry & Spergel, supra note 11, at 401.
64. JAKowsKi, supra note 50, at 40-42.
65. Brantley & DiRosa, supra note 2, at 3; CoNLv, supra note 5, at 18-19.
Conly collected these factors in interviews with Sgt. Joseph Rimondi, Malcolm
Klein, Lonnie Jackson, and Barbara Wade. Conly selected these people to
interview, among others, because of their respective reputations among gang
researchers as experts in the field of gang research. Id. at 1.
66. An interesting method of separating these influences is into offers
and threats or fears and desires. SeeJoshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress:
Justifying the Excuse and Searching for its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1331,
1336-37 (1989) ("Intuitively, society believes that conduct is freer when
individuals respond to temptations than when they act out of fear. Individuals
want what is offered, but not what is threatened." Id. at 1337). A study by Arie
W. Kruglanski and Yoel Yinon has shown that a person who commits an
immoral act in order to gain a benefit is considered more immoral than one
who commits the same act to avoid a loss or harm. Arie W. Kruglanski & Yoel
Yinon, Evaluating an Immoral Act Under Threat Versus Temptation: An Illustration of
the Achievement Principle in Moral Judgment, 3 J. MoRAL EDUC. 167, 168, 172-73
(1974).
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factors may be coupled with other more contemptible motives.
The last two unfortunate stimulants will provide an interesting
case for reduced moral culpability: violence in youths' lives and
protection needs.67
These two factors may overlap; the desired protection could
be needed to combat perceived or threatened violence. This vio-
lence could come from any of several sources, including within
the family, non-gang delinquents, rival gangs, or gang
recruiters.68 The forum could be the home, in school, or simply
on the streets. Regardless of its origin, the reality of many inner
city neighborhoods precludes or discourages residents from seek-
ing traditional forms of protection (i.e., police). 69 If there is a
local gang that can ease this violence and offer the needed pro-
tection the motivation to join is obvious and unfortunate. David
Fattah, co-director of the House of Umoja,7° in Philadelphia, has
recognized this unfortunate reliance; he laments, "[i]f [the
police] were more approachable, 'kids would go to them instead
of some other group, like a gang.' "71
The basic instinct for self-preservation should not be over-
looked as a legitimate and powerful stimulant to gang member-
ship.72 The basic instinct for self-preservation is assured in the
greater society by a police force designed to investigate and
redress wrongs and, when possible, to intervene before the harm.
This is not the case in many gang neighborhoods. The need to
preserve exists nonetheless. To expect members of society, who
are especially at risk, not to fulfill this need is inhumane.
Indeed, criminal law recognizes this need in cases of self-defense,
where an individual is justified in defending himself in the face
of immediate danger (i.e., when ordinary police protection is
unavailable). The gang member who joins a gang for self-preser-
vation reasons is doing no more. His action is simply more
remote.
67. See infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
68. See People v. Cruz, 518 N.E.2d 320 (fI1. App. Ct. 1987) (prosecution
argued that Cruz's gang would shoot the people that they were recruiting;
purportedly, the activity would recur periodically until the person joined), cert.
denied, 526 N.E.2d 834 (Ill. 1988).
69. See infra notes 285-87, 297-99, 317-20 and accompanying text.
70. David Fattah and his wife, Sister Falaka, opened the House of Umoja
in the late 1960s to provide a place for gang members to go to get off the street,
to promote community service activities and educational and job skills
development, and, ultimately, to increase employment. CONLY, supra note 5, at
95.
71. Id. at 48 (quoting telephone interview with David Fattah, House of
Umoja, March 22, 1991).
72. See Mendez, supra note 20, at 76.
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This thinking engenders an "if you can't beat 'em join 'em"
philosophy. However, the negative property and safety externali-
ties" prevalent in gang controlled communities are a major
source of financial burdens, trauma, and feelings of powerless-
ness that need to be eased in some way.74 Although gang affilia-
tion has negative implications for self and family, it can help to
divert other harmful gang activities. The comments of Cory, a
sixteen-year-old gang member from Los Angeles, explaining his
choice to join a gang is indicative: "I joined the Fultons because
there are a lot of people out there who are trying to get you and
if you don't got protection you in trouble sometimes.... [Now] I
don't always have to be looking over my shoulder."7
5
Gang membership may ease the fears associated with life in
violence ridden communities. Indeed, in a study of Philadelphia
youths, Leonard Savitz, Lawrence Rosen, and Michael Lalli tested
the hypothesis that gangs help protect their members and there-
fore that gang members have lower fears of violence and victimi-
zation than non-members in the same community. 76 Although
their study offered few statistically significant results, the results
that were significant are telling. First, black gang members were,
"far more likely to rate their immediate neighborhood as not
dangerous (or [not] very dangerous) during the day time" 7 than
non-gang members. Second, white gang members were signifi-
cantly less afraid of going to and returning from school than
white non-members.7 In general, the fear of being victimized
was lower for gang members than for non-members, although at
a statistically insignificant level.79 Nonetheless, the hypothesis
73. A "negative externality" is an indiscriminately imposed cost or
secondary result that occurs from an activity. For example, the noise created by
a jackhammer is not the intended function of this tool, but it does place a cost
or harm on those in the immediate vicinity. In gang controlled neighborhoods,
negative property and safety externalities may include persistent fears felt by
residents, unintended bystander victims of violence, and decreased property
values, among others.
74. See Mendez, supra note 20, at 74.
75. JANKowsKi, supra note 50, at 45. See also Dave Wielenga, Snoop Doggy
Dogg Faces Trial, RocKy MTN. NEWS, Jan. 29, 1995, at 26A (" [I] n some southern
California neighborhoods... it [is] sometimes difficult to distinguish between
real criminals and those merely... tiptoeing the tightrope of survival. Simply
growing up in certain areas confers some allegiance to the local gang.").
76. Savitz et al., supra note 19, at 152.
77. Id. at 158. Although not statistically significant, at night, black gang
members felt relatively safe 53% of the time compared to 46% for all non-gang
members. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Although the difference from non-gang members was not
significant and may be counter to the actual incidents of victimization, this
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tested, which is valuable in the coercion context, yields modest
support in favor of a gang-as-protector theory and lends some
credibility to the protection claims of gang members.
80
The tentative answers in this Philadelphia study are sup-
ported by the unfortunate story of a seventeen-year-old Chicago
boy, Anthony Burgos.81 Anthony was not in a gang. However,
two sixteen-year-old boys who confronted him on November 29,
1994, were. They asked Anthony what his gang affiliation was.
Anthony responded truthfully that he was not in a gang. The two
boys, then, drew a pistol and shot Anthony in the temple.
Anthony died in a hospital room the next day. The loss was espe-
cially lamented by Roberto Caldero, who has done extensive
gang intervention work in Chicago and organized community
groups against gang violence: "Here are kids who reject that lifes-
tyle, and they can't even walk around."8 2
The tendency or necessity for youths to seek the protection
of one gang from the threats and actions of another gang is not
new. Around 1969, in south Los Angeles, the Crips developed as
a local street gang.8" Soon on its heals, the Bloods organized to
protect its members against the Crips.84 These two gangs are
now, perhaps, the most notorious in the nation with franchises in
numerous cities from coast to coast. Moreover, the danger they
pose extends far into the community. These two gangs have
been known to kill children simply because they were wearing
the wrong color clothing (blue for Crips, red for Bloods) and
were mistaken for the enemy.8 5
Catherine H. Conly has noted in her research that the
strength of various gangs may compel enlistment, that, "some
difference results in large part from the definition of gang member used, which
required the individual to have fought with the gang to be considered a
member. Id. at 158-60.
80. See infra notes 81-87, 148-55, 343-44 and accompanying text.
81. Larry Hartstein, Turning Back on Gangs Didn't Save Teen's Life; He Was
in Wrong Place at Wrong Time, Cops Say, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 1, 1994, at N3.
82. Id.
83. Huff, supra note 9, at 26.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 27. In recent years, the distinct rivalry between the Bloods and
the Crips in the Los Angeles area has subsided with the signing of various truces
by the respective leaders of these two gangs. See Efrain Hernandez, Jr. & David
Ferrell, March a Tribute to Fragile Truce, LA. TmEs, Apr. 29, 1995, at BI. These
agreements were the culmination of years of negotiation, beginning as far back
as 1986, and have since served as a model for similar cease-fire efforts by various
gangs in other areas, including other Bloods and Crips factions. See Todd
Copilevitz, Callfor Gang Truce Repeated, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1994, at
26A; Jesse Katz, Cips and Bloods Factions Prepare Ground for Widespread Gang
Truce, LA TmEs, May 19, 1994, at BI.
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[gangs] may be so intimidating that for non-members to fail to
claim membership is perceived as dangerous."86 These fears are
natural and do not depend on direct or voluntary association
with criminals or gang members. As Albert Reiss' research points
out: "[O]ur sense of personal safety and potential victimization
by crime is shaped less by knowledge of specific criminals than it
is by knowledge of dangerous and safe places and communi-
ties. '"87 The dangerousness of gang-infested communities should
not be ignored as a significant and pernicious factor leading to
gang membership.
2. Gang Recruitment
In addition to individual incentives, it is important to recog-
nize that, to some extent, gangs actively choose whom they want
to have join their ranks. The selection of gang recruits is often a
utilitarian decision that depends, in large part, on the gang's
needs and the prospects' attributes.8 8 The prevalence and power
of such recruiting efforts is difficult to assess and has not been
systematically studied; 9 however, initial attempts have been
made to increase understanding of this phenomenon which
researchers invariably recognize as existing to some degree.90
Researchers have found that gangs use various strategies to
attract or, sometimes, to conscript members. Jankowski has
divided these efforts into three categories: fraternity type recruit-
ment;91 obligation type recruitment;92 and coercive type recruit-
86. CONLY, supra note 5, at 19 (citing a 1991 interview with Jose Morales,
Director of the Chicago Commons Association, where Morales indicated that,
"in the Henry Homer housing development in Chicago, where gang youth
control high-rise buildings in the same way that gangs in other areas control
neighborhoods, youths are afraid to say they are not a part of a gang." Id. at 25
n.98).
87. Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Why are Communities Important in Understanding
Crime?, in 8 COMMUNITIES AND CRIME. CRME ANDJuSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
1, 1 (AlbertJ. Reiss, Jr. & Michael Tonry eds., 1986).
88. CONLY, supra note 5, at 19 (relating conclusions drawn in JANKOWSKI,
supra note 50, at 100).
89. CONLY, supra note 5, at 19 (researchers admit gaps in their knowledge
and understanding).
90. Id. at 19-20.
91. JANKOWSKI, supra note 50, at 48-51 (gangs attempt to attract members
by highlighting the perks and exploits of the gang, showcasing it as a "cool" or
"hip" thing to do).
92. Id. at 51-55 (gang members try to convince prospective members that
the gang performs an important function in protecting and supporting the
community and that it is every man's duty [who has the ability to fight] to give
something back and protect the honor of the community through service in the
gang).
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ment.93 The type of recruitment that is important for this Article
is the coercive type.
The..method of coercion used to recruit can be either
mental or physical. Mental coercion typically involves threaten-
ing the recruit or placing the recruit or his family in an unrea-
sonably dangerous situation. 4 Physical coercion involves the
infliction of .pain on the recruit or members of his family and
may also involve the destruction of the recruit's property.95
Unfortunately, incidents of both types of coercive activity are not
isolated or infrequent and necessarily enlist gang members who
do not want to join and have no real choice in doing so. The
story of an ex-gang member from Los Angeles is illustrative:
I really didn't want to be in any gang, but one day there
was this big blowout [fight] a few blocks from here. A
couple of 0 Streeters who were from another barrio came
and shot up a number of the Dukes [local gang's name].
Then it was said that the 0 Streeters wanted to take over
the area as theirs, so a group of the Dukes went around
asking people to join for awhile till everything got secure.
They asked me, but I still didn't want to get involved
because I really didn't want to get killed over something
that I had no interest in. But they said they wanted me and
if I didn't join and help they were going to mess me up.
Then the next day a couple of them pushed me around
pretty bad, and they did it much harder the following day.
So I thought about it and then decided I'd join.96
Although the pervasiveness of coercive recruitment is not known,
there is some indication that as the number of gangs increases
the use of such measures has as well.97
Appellate courts have considered specific recruitment scena-
rios that are illustrative of the type of threats often involved.9" In
93. Id. at 55-59 (used primarily when the gang needs to increase
membership quickly).
94. Id. at 58.
95. Id. at 59.
96. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
97. See Huff, supra note 9, at 29 (In Chinese gangs in the last fifteen years
there has been a "large increase in the use of intimidation and coercion,
including assault, to recruit new members.").
98. In addition to the scenarios presented in the appellate cases that will
subsequently be discussed, the phenomenon of coercive gang recruitment
surfaces frequently in cases brought by prisoners against the institutions in
which they are housed. The substance of these claims is, generally, that the
prison officials knew of the threats and beatings that were being inflicted to
compel gang membership, but ignored them and failed to protect the afflicted
inmates. See, e.g., Williams v. Sternes, No. 91 C 20074, 1992 WL 74998, at *1-2
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People v. Cruz,99 the defendant, Victor Cruz, was convicted of the
attempted murder ofJavier Garcia. At trial, Garcia testified that
he was walking to school from his parents' home and had gotten
about a block and a half away, when Cruz started to walk toward
him. As Cruz came near he called out Garcia's name and then
shot him in the mouth.' In its closing argument, the prosecution
argued that the incident was gang-related.. Specifically, Cruz was
a member of the Ambros street gang and one of the recruitment
techniques used by this group was to shoot its intended mem-
ber.'0 ' Garcia was the recruit and Cruz was carrying out gang
business by shooting him. Whether this is in fact what was hap-
pening it reveals the reasonableness that such a state of affairs
could exist.
A similar recruitment scenario is presented in People v.
Gardeley. °2  Defendant Rochelle Gardeley was convicted of
attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon, possession of
cocaine, and the commission of a crime in furtherance of a crim-
inal street gang under California's STEP Act.10 3 These crimes
stemmed from the gang beating of Edward Bruno,"°4 however, of
interest here is the testimony by the prosecution's gang expert,
Officer Boyd, offered to show a pattern of criminal gang activity
by Gardeley. In particular, Boyd related an incident for which
Gardeley had been convicted for being an accessory to a terrorist
attack.' 5 Gardeley and three other members of the Family Crip
Gang wanted to recruit an independent drug dealer, Michael
Halliburton, to sell drugs for their organization. When Hallibur-
ton refused, the gang members followed him to his house. They
knocked on his door and when Halliburton's mother answered
they told her to send her son outside so that they could kill him.
(Apr. 3, 1992, N.D. Ill.) (plaintiff was struck in the face with a baseball bat to
encourage his involvement in a gang).
99. 518 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 526 N.E.2d 834 (Ill.
1988).
100. Id. at 322.
101. Id. at 321, 328. In the alternative, the prosecution also argued that
the incident was a pay back for Garcia's involvement in a rival gang, the
Bishops. Id. at 328. Garcia testified, however, that he had quit that gang several
months before the shooting, id. at 322, which would not necessarily discount
this alternative theory, but would involve the prosecution adopting another
contention, to be made later in this Article, that quitting a gang may not relieve
the dangers previously posed by rival groups. See infra notes 148-55 and
accompanying text.
102. 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994), cert. granted, 890 P.2d 1115
(Cal. 1995).
103. Id. at 137-38.
104. Id. at 138.
105. Id. at 140.
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Halliburton's mother called the police and when the police
arrived they found that one of the gang members was carrying a
sawed-off shotgun.
10 6
In a non-adversarial context, less subject to self-serving moti-
vation, Jack Hynes, from the Cook County State's Attorney's
Office, estimated that, "[i]ntimidation probably plays a role in
only 20 percent of gang recruitment."10 7 Twenty percent is no
small number when one considers that gang membership in the
Chicago area alone is estimated at between 30,000 to 50,000
hard-core gang members and as many as 100,000 peripheral
gang members and wannabees.108
David W. Thompson and Leonard A. Jason have made some
preliminary inquiries into the recruitment environment in Chi-
cago. According to their study, at least 110 gangs in Chicago
actively recruit new members, with public schools (even elemen-
tary schools) serving as fertile recruiting grounds.109 This con-
nection to schools has been recognized in other studies as well.
In a 1981 survey of Chicago public schools, roughly 40,000
school children claimed they had been attacked or threatened by
gang members and many were afraid to go to school for fear of
gang recruiters.110 Araceli Corona, 1994 valedictorian at Bowen
High in Chicago's southeast side, recognized this relationship:
"This is where the gangs conduct all of their business, their trans-
actions. They'll get their customers. This is the place where
they'll eat. This is . . .their recruit station. " "' Discussing gang
activity at Bowen, Susan DeGrane recounts the most horrifying
comment that a student can make to his teacher: "They're after
me. ' 11 2 Experience has shown that a brutal beating or even
death is frequently forthcoming.
The destruction of the public school system through gang
domination is particularly troublesome. In effect, it has created a
continuous supply of children with increased potential and
incentive to join gangs. As the classroom becomes dangerous or
106. Id. Gardeley's convictions under the street gang offenses were
overturned in this decision, because Boyd's testimony was inadmissible hearsay
and no other evidence established the necessary gang connection. Id. at 143-
44.
107. CONLY, supra note 5, at 19 (emphasis added).
108. Andrew Martin & George Papajohn, Suburbs Touched by Gangs:
Commission Details Activity Outside City, CHI. TRIa., Feb. 2, 1995, at 1.
109. Thompson & Jason, supra note 5, at 324.
110. Id. (citingJ. H. CLtARK, CHICAGO BOARD OF EDUCATION, A REPORT OF
THE GANG Acivrrlms TASK FORCE (1981)).
111. Susan DeGrane, Danger: School Zone, NOTRE DAME MAC., Winter
1994-95, at 38, 43.
112. Id. at 42.
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unattainable and education deteriorates, due to gang control, so
too will the ability of students to find and maintain employ-
ment. 1 3 The demise of the schools, therefore, serves to perpetu-
ate the cycle of poverty and depression that has allowed gangs to
attain and exert their authority.
Clearly, coercive recruitment exists. That is exists at all is
sufficient for this discussion. Its extent and severity adds to the
weight and believability of an individual gang member's claim
that he did not want to join his gang but was faced with an unrea-
sonable threat of force.
D. Restrictions on Actions and the Ability to Leave Once
Within a Gang
The three typical structures that large gangs take each posit
a group of leaders that direct the activities of associates and
recruits.' 14 Unfortunately, in some gangs these orders carry com-
manding force. In such cases, if a member does not do what he
is supposed to do the repercussions may be serious. 15
The primary situation in which a gang member may fear
retaliatory punishment is when the leaders direct some particular
activity or goal and the gang member refuses. An alternative sce-
nario exists when the gang itself is threatened from a rival or
other source. If a gang member does not respond with appropri-
ate force - if he did not react in a similar manner as other mem-
bers - he may be punished for his idle reaction and failure to
defend the gang.116
Helton v. State1 17 offers a poignant example of the institution-
alized use of violence to control of the activity of gang members.
James Helton was convicted for participating in a criminal gang,
the Imperial Gangster Disciples. Specifically, Helton's offense
derived from the initiation, or beating, of Travis Hammons1 1
The initiation involved what the gang called a "46," where the
113. See Barry Glick, Governor's Task Force Tackles Growing Juvenile Gang
Problem, CORRECTIONs TODAY, July 1992, at 92, 94 ("A youth's positive
development is directly correlated with his or her level of involvement in
school.").
114. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. State, 395 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ind. 1979)
(defendants feared that Robert Taggart, the leader of their gang, would kill
them or their families or would have them killed if they did not obey his orders
or if they attempted to get out of the gang).
116. SeeJANKOWSKI, supra note 50, at 144 (gang members attacked other
members who did not fight with the requisite tenacity in a battle with a rival
gang); Kennedy & Baron, supra note 50, at 103.
117. 624 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993).
118. Id. at 504.
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current members would encircle the new member and strike him
in the head forty times and in the chest six times." 9 In addition,
the Imperial Gangster Disciples used various forms of physical
violence to discipline members for infractions against the gang.
Any member who missed a meeting would "get violated" -
receives six blows to the chest - and any member who defied or
hurt the gang or tried to leave the gang would be "eight-balled"
- circled by eight members and beaten until the offending
member changed his mind or mended his ways. 120 Due to the
gang policy of internal threats and attacks, it is fair to assume that
genuine fears would accompany any attempt by an Imperial
Gangster Disciple to break from the gang or to refuse, or even
question, a gang directive.1
21
A similar policy of enforcing gang directives is presented in
People v. Ganus.a22 The defendant, Victor Ganus, was a member
of the Latin Kings street gang, although at the time he commit-
ted the crime involved in this case he was incarcerated in a state
prison in Illinois. Supposedly under orders from Latin Kings
leadership, Ganus killed a fellow inmate, Lucas Gonzalez, when it
was discovered that Gonzalez had raped a friend of the Latin
Kings before he entered the prison system. In his defense at trial
and as a mitigating factor against the imposition of the death
penalty at sentencing, Ganus argued that the order, by Latin
Kings leadership to kill Gonzalez, had coerced his actions.'
21
According to Ganus, failure to follow a gang order could result in
death; 124 he killed Gonzalez because, if he did not, he feared that
he would be killed himself. Although, due to the circumstances,
the veracity of this particular coercion claim may be questioned,
it is nonetheless another piece of evidence that helps support the
similar claims of others.'25
119. Id.
120. Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals recognized the use of strikingly
similar disciplinary actions by a gang called the "G's," in Jackson v. State, 634
N.E.2d 532, 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
121. The activities of the Imperial Gangster Disciples were not in dispute
in this case. Helton, 624 N.E.2d at 504. Rather, the chief inquiry of the court
was the constitutionality of Indiana's anti-gang statute, which, after considering
various challenges at length, the court determined that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague, id. at 506-07, did not unconstitutionally interfere with
the right to freedom of association, id. at 511, and did not deprive Helton of
equal protection of the laws. Id. at 512.
122. 594 N.E.2d 211 (Ill. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1055 (1993).
123. Id. at 214.
124. Id.
125. See Philip P. Pan, Girl Apparently was Killed for Warning Friend, Source
Says, WASH. PosT, Dec. 5, 1995, at BI ("[G]irl found slain in the woods last
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In United States v. Campbell,126 defendants, John Campbell
and Riley Fultz, were inmates in a federal prison where they
joined a prison gang called the Wolverines. At their trial for
bank robbery, Campbell and Fultz asserted that Wolverines lead-
ership (also in prison) ordered them, under penalty of death, to
escape and rob banks for the gang. 127 Indeed, the two defend-
ants felt that the Wolverines' threats followed them with equal
force outside the prison walls as they had within the prison sys-
tem. In their defense, neither Campbell nor Fultz denied their
participation in the bank robberies. Rather, each based his case
on the presence of gang coercion. 28 Undoubtedly, the defend-
ants believed that the threats they faced were sufficient and con-
crete enough to hinge their freedom on the hope that a judge
and jury would listen to and believe their story. The trial judge,
however, did not believe their story, or at least did not believe it
was relevant to their guilt, and refused to subpoena witnesses
requested by the defense to support their coercion claims.' 29
Similarly, the trial judge refused to instruct the jury on a duress
defense because evidence supporting the necessary elements had
not been presented.' The Sixth Circuit affirmed both of these
conclusions. 13 '
Although complete comparisons cannot be drawn between
prison and street gangs, prison gangs are bountiful sources of
gang knowledge. In particular, the difference in mobility should
always be kept in mind when comparing these two groups. At
least in theory, a street gang member can escape the reaches of
the gang by moving to another location.' 3 2 A prison inmate's
movement and susceptibility to prison gangs depends solely on
week, apparently was killed because she warned a friend that her gang was
planning to beat him up .....").
126. 675 F.2d 815 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850 (1982).
127. Id. at 817.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 818. The reason for this denial is, perhaps, best explained by
the Eighth Circuit ruling on the same issue and the same facts regarding the
same defendants. In particular, the judge refused to subpoena the requested
witnesses because Campbell and Fultz had not presented evidence establishing
the immediacy of the threats against them (as required for a duress defense)
and the proposed witnesses could not remedy this deficiency. United States v.
Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980).
For a discussion of the immediacy requirement of classic duress, see infra notes
267-77 and accompanying text.
130. Campbell 675 F.2d at 821.
131. Id.
132. This is not a realistic possibility for most street gang members,
however, because the poverty that necessarily subjects them to the gang
environment often precludes them from the means to change residence.
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his placement by prison officials. This confinement can cut the
other way as well. Prison authorities can insulate individuals to a
degree that is unattainable on the street. In sum, playing on the
increased confinement and decreased mobility, the coercive
power in prison gangs may be greater than on the streets. This is
not to say, however, that a prison gang's power is confined inside
the prison walls.
Recently, the distinction between prison and street gangs
has blurred.1"' The Wolverines are a prime example," s but they
are not alone. For example, the Nuestro Carnales, a Texas
prison gang, have endeavored to expand their power into the
community outside the walls.' Indeed, according to a Federal
Bureau of Prisons study, "gang members released from prison
are often expected under the penalty of death to continue work-
ing for their fellow members inside."" 6
Expansion has moved in the other way as well. Highly
franchised street gangs such as the Bloods and the Crips have
increased their power and presence in prisons.'3 7 As members of
these gangs are incarcerated, they maintain their gang affilia-
tion.13 8 Once enough members reside in the same facility they
can begin normal operations there, including recruitment of
new members. The distinction, therefore, between prison and
street gangs is ever decreasing8 9 and knowledge about one
group is helpful to understanding the activities of the other.
With this reciprocity in mind, a profile of seven major gangs
in the Texas prison system may shed some light on the pervasive-
ness of internal gang violence. The unifying characteristic of
these gangs is that once a convict commits to one of these organi-
zations the only way out is death. 40 One particular Texas prison
gang, the Texas Syndicate, is especially known for its violence
and has adopted a paramilitary structure with strictly enforced
rules to pursue its agenda. A violation of these rules may result
in death.' In fact, it is understood by the gang's members that
133. Craig H. Trout, Taking a New Look at an Old Problem, CoRREcrIONS
TODAY, July 1992, at 62, 64.
134. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
135. Salvador Buentello, Profiles of the Seven Major Gangs, CoRREcTIONS
TODAY, July 1992, at 59, 59.
136. Trout, supra note 133, at 64. See also CONLY, supra note 5, at 56.
137. Trout, supra note 133, at 64.
138. Id.
139. See id. See also CONLY, supra note 5, at 56.
140. Buentello, supra note 135, at 59.
141. Id.
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'they must obey the commands of the leaders, even if this means
committing acts of violence. 42
Perhaps the most violent prison gang, the Aryan Brother-
hood has been involved in about 18 percent of all homicides in
the federal prison system in the last ten years.'14  Although this
gang was established to promote white supremacy, its most
recent and prevalent activities have been directed toward the
internal discipline of its members."M It is plain, that within this
gang, notorious throughout the federal prison system for its use
of deadly force even toward its own members, the ability to resist
a gang directive is minimal and life threatening.
Of course, not all gangs coercively direct the activities of
their members or compel that they retain their membership. In
some gangs, failing to satisfy the gang's requirements will lead to
a loss of honor and status as a member.141 In other gangs, one
need only resign or dissociate quietly from the group.146 This
does not mean, however, that coercive forces are necessarily
absent for members of such organizations. In any of these situa-
tions, the practical ability to separate from a gang should not be
overestimated.
The consensus of a panel of five gang members from
Cabrini Green Housing Project in Chicago was that the ability to
leave the gang was effectually none: rival gang members do not
know whether you have left your gang and they certainly will not
take your word for it.14 7 In this respect, gang affiliation is usually
142. See Salvador Buentello, Combatting [sic] Gangs in Texas, CoRmEcrIONS
TODAY, July 1992, at 58, 60. Buentello argues that prison gangs who require
their members to break the law can help to increase the number of prison gang
members willing to provide information about their gangs to prison authorities.
Id. Although this relationship may exist in the context of prison gangs, any
parallel to street gangs should be minimal at best. A prison inmate does not
risk as much as an unincarcerated gang member in going to the authorities -
he is already in prison and the victims of his gang activities are likely prisoners
as well. Prison informants also may be offered incentives that are not applicable
in the street (e.g., recreation time, "good time"). Furthermore, access to the
authorities without fear of reprisal is increased in prison. In the prison system
the ability to protect a particular informant is much greater (although not
perfect). See also William Riley, Taking a Two-pronged Approach to Managing
Washington's Gangs, COIuRc-riONs TODAY, July 1992, at 68, 70.
143. Trout, supra note 133, at 62.
144. Id.
145. Kennedy & Baron, supra note 50, at 89-90.
146. JANKOWSKI, supra note 50, at 61-62, 314.
147. Panel of 5 Cabrini Green gang members, discussion at Notre Dame
University (Jan. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Panel Discussion] (conducted by
Brother Bill Tomes from The Brothers and Sisters of Love).
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for life.148 Researchers have had difficulty identifying the periph-
eries of gangs and their members,1 49 especially in loosely organ-
ized gangs with unrestricted exit opportunities; rival gangs rarely
have better information and they may not even care that the ex-
member has ended his gang affiliation. Therefore, the increase
in personal safety achieved by leaving the gang is often quite
small, especially when one considers that the deserting member
will no longer have the support of other gang members to pro-
tect him and discourage attack.
Gang protection, whether it is the prime motivation forjoin-
ing a gang, is certainly an important consideration regarding
continued involvement. Leslie Kennedy and Stephen Baron's
study of the instigation of violence by gang members indicates
that the selection of gang victims is often a rational process of
risk minimization where solitary figures are the prime targets.1 50
Even if an individual can defend himself in confrontations with
solitary gang members, he will not be able to defend himself
against an entire gang. Gang protection may be necessary to
assert one's own rights, to stand up and protect oneself. Says
Officer David Stallard, who is stationed at an in-school police
unit at Bowen High in Chicago, Illinois:
Before, there'd be a lot of fighting one on one, and that
would be the end of it. Now it doesn't stop there. I've
never seen such a need for revenge. They'll get the whole
gang after the kid who beat them one on one. And they
won't stop till he's dead, or at least until they've carried out
some death attempt.151
The ability to separate is even smaller still if one embraces
the results in Savitz', Rosen's, and Lalli's Philadelphia study.15
Along these lines, research has suggested that a delinquent per-
son is a more attractive target for gang and other crime, since
such a person can be attacked with some measure of impunity. 5 5
This impunity results from a decreased likelihood that gang
member or ex-gang member victims will report crimes to the
police for fear of implicating themselves and, even if they do, a
decreased likelihood that the police will believe or even care
148. See also Howard Dukes, Gang Vows arefor Life, S. BEND T IB., Nov. 19,
1995, at Al.
149. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
150. Kennedy & Baron, supra note 50, at 101-02.
151. DeGrane, supra note 111, at 42.
152. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (fear of being
victimized is lower for gang members than for non-gang members).
153. Kennedy & Baron, supra note 50, at 93.
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about the claims of such offensive victims.15 4 Not so remarkable,
but worth spelling out specifically, one is more likely to be a vic-
tim of crime if one participates in crime and hangs out in risky
areas.155 This increased susceptibility is not completely dimin-
ished merely by ending gang membership.
The question, then, is whether society can punish a gang
member who has been coerced into joining his gang, either by
threats of violence or protection needs, and has been compelled
to remain in the gang and participate in gang activities by similar
forces. The answer depends on the degree to which the coercive
forces existed and how this compulsion relates to a moral theory
of punishment. This is the topic we will next address.
III. THE NECESSARY LINK BETWEEN CULPABILiTY
AND PUNISHMENT
Despite state legislatures' attempts to tighten their grips on
gang violence and the general public's fear of gangs typified by
its support for the "war on crime," prosecution cannot proceed
at the indiscriminate expense of all gang members. Combating
gangs is not necessarily inconsistent with helping and excusing a
certain class of gang members (the coerced ones). Despite laws
that make membership and activity in gangs criminal per se, not
all such "criminals" are morally culpable and worthy of punish-
ment. This general statement applies not only to the association
offenses typical of anti-gang statutes, but also to specific criminal
acts in furtherance of gangs.
A. Theoretical Basis for Punishment
From Plato to Hart, philosophers have debated whether we
should punish and, if so, why we should punish. Of those who
think that punishment is a proper institution, some endorse it
for its reformative or rehabilitative potential; some endorse it for
its retributive value; and some endorse it for its deterrent
effects. 156 These functions need not be mutually exclusive,
although, depending on the circumstances of the crime, each
may suggest a different degree of punishment.
Punishment for crime may be morally justified as it tends to
maintain order in society.' 57 That punishment may be justified,
154. Id.
155. Id. at 98.
156. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTIcE 45 (1976). See also OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 42 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1881);
NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 6-9 (1991).
157. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 386.
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if not required, in certain situations, does not help define who
should be punished and to what extent that person should be
punished. The answers to these questions depend on one's justi-
fication or rationale for punishing or the purpose punishment is
to serve (i.e. reformation, rehabilitation, deterrence, or retribu-
tion). It is necessary to examine the rationales behind these vari-
ous functions in order to understand the implications each has
for the appropriate limits of just punishment.
1. Reformation, Rehabilitation, Deterrence, and
Consequentialist Theory
In appropriate situations, reformation, rehabilitation, 158 and
deterrence theories recommend punishment to consequentialist
thinkers. According to consequentialist theory, punishment is
warranted if its overall consequences produce "good" in a utilita-
rian sense, 159 that is, the total good produced exceeds the total
evil.16 ° The unifying characteristic of consequentialist theory is
the belief that a specific individual may be punished not because
of a prior bad act, but because of the effect that the punishment
will have on the criminal disposition of that person or the future
criminal plans or tendencies of that person and others. Thus,
the punishment is not an end in itself but is used as a means for
shaping behavior to maximize the good of society. The punish-
ment itself is not the good, but, rather, the good is found in the
consequences that the punishment produces.
Different people envision differently the good that society
realizes through punishment. Conceptions of the relevant good
include the assured liberty of citizens living under rule of law,
crime control, public welfare,' 6 ' reputation, and privacy.'62 The
promotion of one of these notions is not necessary here.
Instead, it is the entire conglomeration of these ideas, as well as
all others, that is important since, for consequentialists, it is the
total good of society that should be elevated. Significant, and
158. Reformation and rehabilitation, although similar, refer to distinct
objectives whose difference should not be forgotten or ignored. Specifically,
reformation means the improvement one's character while rehabilitation refers
to acquiring job or other legitimate skills to aid the legal functioning of the
individual in society. The two objectives are similar in that each is concerned
with the betterment or alteration of the individual being punished.
159. Antony Duff & David Garland, Introduction: Thinking about
Punishment, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 1, 6 (Antony Duff & David Garland
eds., 1994).
160. JEREmY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION 170 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1823).
161. Duff & Garland, supra note 159, at 6.
162. ALAN GEWIRTH, REASON AND MoP, Arry 294 (1978).
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worthy of note in this balance, are the rights of the individual
criminal. This person has a definite interest in not being pun-
ished.16 Accordingly, as the benefits from punishment diminish
or if the crime was minimal to begin with, the harm that may be
felt by the criminal through further penalty is likely to outweigh
the minimal benefits.
Given this skeletal framework of consequentialist theory, it is
important to understand how this theory influences or should
influence punishment aimed at reformation, rehabilitation, and
deterrence. Specifically, when, why, and to what extent is pun-
ishment appropriate for consequentialist thinkers?
First, consider a consequentialist theory of punishment in
which the primary goal is to reform or rehabilitate the crimi-
nal.16 4 With these goals in mind, the individual criminal propen-
sities of the person to be punished would determine the extent
of punishment warranted. Punishment would last only as long as
the good produced or capable of being produced by the further
extinction of criminal tendencies outweighs the evil caused by
the restraint on the individual freedom of the person being pun-
ished - only as long as the good outweighs the evil. However,
no matter what the crime, if punishment were appropriate solely
to reform or rehabilitate, then it necessarily must end when it
appeared that the individual criminal would not repeat the crime
or when it appeared that a particular person was incorrigible. 65
If the criminal act was merely a one-time transgression or if the
criminal were, in fact, incorrigible, then punishment would not
be warranted at all. Something is amiss in the latter case because
the incorrigible criminal surely deserves some punishment. The
former case may or may not represent an appropriate penalty
depending on the particular circumstances of the crime.
Regardless, in both cases, punishment has definite limits if we
have only reformation or rehabilitation in view. From a conse-
quentialist perspective, the punishment must end when the harm
163. This interest in avoiding punishment is not unlimited. There may
be situations where punishment would be beneficial to the individual criminal.
For example, if X's avoiding punishment for rape contributes causally to X
raping again, then it would perhaps have been in X's interest to have been
punished. In such a case, the interest in avoiding punishment would be offset
by the good furthered in the particular criminal if a repeat offense could be
avoided.
164. It is somewhat artificial to separate consequentialist thought into its
various components, since consequentialists are concerned with rehabilitation,
reformation, and deterrence at once. This separation, however, facilitates an
understanding of the implications that each of these components has on the
measurement of punishment.
165. HoLuEs, supra note 156, at 42.
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occasioned by the punishment outweighs the good that could be
achieved through further penalty.
The necessity of the utilitarian constraints placed on refor-
mation or rehabilitation based punishment can be illustrated
well by the limitless and unprincipled punishment that is possi-
ble if such constraints are ignored. If reformation or rehabilita-
tion were removed from the utilitarian cloak of consequentialist
theory or if the rights of the criminal were ignored in the balanc-
ing of goods, punishment could proceed indefinitely. Without
the limitations that consequentialist utilitarianism brings, so long
as progress is capable of being made, even if it is at a particularly
slow rate, punishment may continue. This seems to be a prob-
lem and underscores the need to retain the utilitarian con-
straints on consequentialist theories of punishment.
Deterrence based punishment has different goals in mind.
Specifically, deterrence is designed to promote two ends. It can
either be general (i.e., punishing one person will influence the
actions of others because they will see what the consequences will
be) or it can be specific (i.e., the individual being punished will
realize the harm to himself that his actions have caused and will
not want to repeat them). As with reformation and rehabilita-
tion, the use of deterrence to justify punishment can also be
problematic.
In particular, it may be immoral to use deterrence as ajusti-
fication for punishment because deterrence does not establish a
principled means for scaling penalties and treats the individual
as a means only and not also as an end in himself.'66 With
respect to the first of these shortcomings, it is rational to assume
that the threat of punishment will often influence the decision to
commit a crime. Thus, if society wants to discourage crime,
extremely long sentences might help achieve the maximum
effect. 67 As a specific deterrent, life imprisonment or capital
punishment for all crimes would prevent those malefactors who
were convicted from committing other crimes against the gen-
eral populace; it may help as a general deterrent as well. This is
manifestly improper. In this regard, the primary vice of deter-
rence based punishment is the severity of sentences that may
result. With respect to the second, moral criticism, although as a
specific deterrent such punishment would use the individual
166. Id. at 42-43.
167. Absolute deterrence of crime is not always desirable, because there
are situations where the value obtained from committing the crime is more
beneficial for society than the harm that it causes. On this topic, see A.
MITCHELL POLINSKy, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONoMIcS 75-86 (2d ed.
1989).
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toward his own end, 168 the punishment, in itself, would be a
mere means. As a general deterrent, punishment again "uses"
the one being punished, even though the end sought is the bet-
terment of others; the punishment, itself, remains a mere means.
That is, the individual criminal would be used for society in gen-
eral and other would-be criminals in particular.
Addressing the alleged immorality of treating a person as a
means only and not also as an end in himself, Oliver Wendell
Holmes agreed that by showcasing the individual as a warning to
others or punishing that person to discourage recidivism, punish-
ment does not treat the one being punished as an end in himself;
it uses him as a means employed to repulse future acts. 1 6 9
Holmes, however, discounts this moral difficulty, noticing that
community life requires some surrender of individuality for the
good of the group.
To be sure, criminal law has censored acts and actors when
the particularities, taken alone, do not seem to warrant punish-
ment (i.e., strict liability crimes), aT7 In such cases, the aim of
criminal law is to shape actions - it is active, not reactive - and
the temptation is to subordinate individual culpability to the
demands of public welfare.' 7 1 Declaring that crime is what, in
the name of public welfare, society says it is, Holmes wrote: "The
first requirement of a sound body of law is, that it should corre-
spond with the actual feelings and demands of the community,
whether right or wrong."1 7 2 In support, Holmes holds commu-
nity standards above the individuality of the actor:
[W] hen we are dealing with that part of the law which aims
more directly than any other at establishing standards of
conduct, we should expect there more than elsewhere to
find that the tests of liability are external and independent
168. Whatever the "end" of the particular individual being punished, the
focus of specific deterrence on this particular individual necessitates that the
punishment be directed toward some end of this person.
169. HOLMES, supra note 156, at 43 (attributing this discussion to
Immanuel Kant without citation).
170. A "crime" is usually marked by the "concurrence of an evil-meaning
mind with an evil-doing hand." Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251(1952). However, advances in technology and the increased congestion and
mobility of society have facilitated the acceptance of what have been termed
"public welfare offenses" - where criminal liability is not dependent on intent
or even action in some cases, but on a statutory duty imposed to encourage the
active prevention of proscribed events. Id. at 255-56. For excellent discussions
of the bases for such offenses, see United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975);
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
171. HOLMES, supra note 156, at 49.
172. Id. at 41.
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of the degree of evil in the particular person's motives or
intentions. 178
This reasoning surely would explain the acceptance of strict lia-
bility in criminal law, but it does not justify a failure to inspect
individual culpability for more infamous offenses. 174 The moral
difficulty remains.
Aside from the moral implications, the theoretical (utilita-
rian) base of deterrence must not be forgotten. The good
sought is a future decrease in crime, however, the crime control
good attained from excessive sentences is not without its counter-
vailing evil. Cautioning from a utilitarian perspective against the
punishment of innocents, H.L.A. Hart wrote: "[A] system which
openly empowered authorities to [punish the innocent], even if
it succeeded in averting specific evils . . ., would awaken such
apprehension and insecurity that any gain from the exercise of
these powers would by any utilitarian calculation be offset by the
misery caused by their existence." 175 This argument can be
taken beyond the mere punishment of the innocent to those
cases in which persons are punished beyond their culpability.
Surely, if innocent people are punished without having commit-
ted a crime, ordinary people would fear the safety of their own
liberty. Similarly, if punishment extends beyond culpability, peo-
ple would rightly fear that a minor transgression would engender
an exorbitant response. In either case, the benefit to society is
surely outweighed by the evil produced by the injustice and arbi-
trariness of the punishment.
Although difficulties exist with using reformation, rehabilita-
tion, or deterrence as universally applicable bases for punish-
ment, the purpose of this discussion is not to poke holes. Rather,
these shortcomings are important to recognize in order to
understand why these justifications for punishment must be con-
strained by their consequentialist foundations. So long as this
underlying theory is maintained, all three rationales should
arrive at appropriate levels of punishment in coercion cases.1
76
2. Non-consequentialist, Retribution Theory
In his exploration of the proper basis for punishment,
Andrew von Hirsch argues:
While deterrence explains why most people benefit from
the existence of punishment, the benefit to the many is not
173. Id. at 50.
174. E.g., theft, assault, and rape.
175. H.LA. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 12 (1968).
176. See infra notes 202-09 and accompanying text.
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by itself a just basis for depriving the offender of his liberty
and reputation. Some other reason, then, is needed to
explain the suffering inflicted on the offender: that reason
is desert. 1
77
Von Hirsch's desert rationale is similar to the notion of retribu-
tion and is non-consequentialist in nature. Any punishment
must be for a prior bad act; the effect this may have on the future
actions of anyone is insufficient in itself as a justification for the
punishment, even if it may be necessary to it.
Retribution can be thought of in many ways. Essentially, it is
punishment in response to previous evil-doing. Referring to the
reasoning of Hegel, Holmes styled retribution in rather abstract
terms: " [W]rong being the negation of right, punishment is the
negation of that negation, or retribution."1 78 In their writings,
John Finnis and Alan Gewirth have characterized retribution as
the equalization of an unfair advantage. 179 Society operates on
the basic premise that members should refrain from criminal
conduct. Everyone benefits from this state of affairs. When a
crime is committed, however, the criminal not only benefits from
the self-restraint of others, but he also benefits from the spoils of
his crime and, thereby, gains an unfair advantage. The purpose
of punishment is to offset this advantage and equalize society by
applying a burden to the criminal. Additionally, as previously
noted, von Hirsch labels the retributive notion as "desert"; peo-
ple are punished because they deserve to be punished due to
prior wrongdoing."' 0 These various conceptions differ in their
formulation of retribution, but they all rest on the same premise
and should achieve the same punishment result.
Once it is determined that someone deserves to be pun-
ished, how much punishment is deserved still must be decided.
According to non-consequentialist, retributivist theory, only the
guilty may be punished and then only to the extent of their guilt
or blameworthiness for the crime for which they are being pun-
177. VON HIRscH, supra note 156, at 51.
178. HOLMES, supra note 156, at 42.
179. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 263-64 (1980);
GEWIRTH, supra note 162, at 294-99. Von Hirsch also discusses the concept of
unfair advantage, in Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Proportionality, in A READER
ON PUNISHMENT, supra note 159, at 115, 116, however, he chooses, instead, to
define retribution in terms of desert. See infra notes 180, 183-85 and
accompanying text.
180. VON HIRSCH, supra note 156, at 46. Von Hirsch selected the word
"desert," because he believed that the traditional use and meaning of
"retribution" was misleading. The idea behind von Hirsch's word, nonetheless,
is the same. Id. at 45-46.
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ished.' l Elaborating on the retributive position on punishment,
Herbert Packer argues, "that punishment must be proportioned
to the offense. The graver the offense (on some kind of scale of
moral outrage), the more severe the punishment."182 This is
unsurprising, given that the very notion of retribution is to
negate a wrong, to equalize unfair advantage, or to give someone
what they deserve.
The principle that punishment should be constrained by
culpability is perhaps most easily understood with reference to
von Hirsch's notion of desert. In the measure of punishment,
von Hirsch discards abstract notions about the negation of
wrong, in favor of the clarity attainable through common sense
understandings of equity; most people would perceive dispropor-
tionate punishments as unfair.183 He explains: "Severity of pun-
ishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the
wrong. Only grave wrongs merit severe penalties; minor mis-
deeds deserve lenient punishments. Disproportionate penalties
are undeserved . *.".."184 Similarly, von Hirsch also argues that
individuals who are punished are often perceived as deserving as
large or as small a penalty as they receive - that they are as
morally reprehensible as their sentence indicates. 85 Conviction
and punishment carry with them a certain degree of reprobation
from society which increases as the penalty increases. If an indi-
vidual is punished beyond his culpability, he is being fitted with a
larger degree of public reprobation than deserved; this reproba-
tion will continue beyond the termination of the imposed sen-
tence which makes the justice of the fit all the more important.
Indeed, it is generally accepted that, in criminal law, there
should be a "bond between wrong and punishment."' 86 This
conclusion is a cornerstone of just punishment and is widely rec-
ognized as such, independent of retributive notions. The reason-
ing of John Locke and Herbert Morris 8 7 is illustrative.
181. Duff & Garland, supra note 159, at 7.
182. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 14
"(1968).
183. VON HiRscH, supra note 156, at 69.
184. Id. at 66 (emphasis omitted).
185. Id. at 71-72.
186. HoLMEs, supra note 156, at 42.
187. H.LA. Hart should be included in this list as well, however, since he
drew the connection between culpability and punishment on utilitarian
grounds, it was more appropriate to present his reasoning within the discussion
of consequentialist theory. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
COERCION DEFENSE FOR THE STREET GANG CRIMINAL
Locke explained the necessary relationship between wrong
and punishment as social contract. Exploring the extent of the
legislative power, Locke wrote:
It cannot be supposed that [society] should intend, had
[it] a power so to do, to give any one or more an absolute
arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a
force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited
will arbitrarily upon [it]; this [would] put [society] into a
worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein they had
a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others,
and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether
invaded by a single man or many in combination.""'
Since, in Locke's theory, the authority to govern derives from the
assent of the people, it cannot legitimately act beyond the power
given. Surely, society would not consent to be judged and pun-
ished arbitrarily nor punished beyond their own blameworthi-
ness in acting. 189 Thus, the state does not and should not possess
the power to punish beyond individual culpability.
Morris reaches basically the same conclusion through what
he terms a paternalistic theory of punishment. 9 ' This theory
posits that punishment is proper when it increases the good and
promotes the growth of the person punished, 191 much in the
same way that parents' interferences into the activities of their
children are designed to teach and improve. 92 However, if pun-
ishment is inflicted beyond the blameworthiness or wrongfulness
of the act, then that punishment would frustrate this rationale."9 '
Indeed, if non-blameworthy activity is punished, then the good of
the individual will not be furthered; instead, the punishment will
confuse him. Morris summarizes this position: "[L]aw plays an
indispensable role in our knowing what for society is good and
188. JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, BOOK II para. 137, at
191 (Thomas I. Cook ed. 1947).
189. See WALKER, supra note 156, at 92-94.
190. Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, in A READER ON
PUNISHMENT, supra note 159, at 95.
191. The good being promoted is essentially the identity of the individual
as a morally autonomous person. Id. at 98. Morris describes this good as
composed of many parts, including: the appreciation of the evil involved in
doing wrong; the feeling of guilt as this encourages the restoration of harm
caused or making amends; the commitment to benevolent activity in the future;
and, the conception of oneself as a responsible person, responsible for having
done wrong, and worthy of respect as an individual. Id. at 98-99.
192. Id. at 95-96, 97, 104. A similar notion has also be termed the
communicative function of punishment, where the punishment imposed
expresses to the wrongdoer that his action was wrong.
193. Id. at 104.
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evil. Failure to punish serious wrongdoing, [or] punishment of
wrongdoing in circumstances where fault is absent, would serve
only to baffle our moral understanding and threaten what is so
often already precarious." 94
If we punish individuals beyond their culpability, we not
only do not restore order to society, but we further upset it. If
punishment were inflicted beyond culpability, then that punish-
ment would create more of the evil that it was designed to
remove. Holmes wrote: "Thus the punishment must be equal, in
the sense of proportionate to the crime, because its only function
is to destroy it."' 9 5 Retributive theories of punishment, although
not providing a talismanic formula for determining a precise
penalty, treat punishment as a morally defensible response to a
crime, and, furthermore, facilitate the process of reasoning to an
appropriate level of punishment. Where the culpability of the
person punished is not out of proportion to the punishment
inflicted, the punishment is just. Where punishment is justified
it is not a wrong. Just punishment is a rightful response to the
wrong occasioned by crime and is the moral way to maintain the
order of society.
B. Application to Coercion Defenses and the Gang Situation
1. Basis for Coercion as an Exculpatory Factor
The criminal law has recognized that sufficiently coerced
acts do not warrant punishment; various coercion defenses have
evolved to harness these cases. It is important to determine who
and what acts these defenses should cover. To decide this, it is
necessary to understand exactly what coercion is and how it
would be analyzed under the theories of punishment discussed
above. 196
An act is coerced when the will or impetus for acting is the
product of an unreasonable force or threat of force, that is, when
the person would have done otherwise had the force not been
present. What constitutes a sufficient coercive "force" is more
complex. When William Blackstone wrote his commentaries on
the common law, he limited the scope of relevant forces to those
that threaten life or other bodily harm; a mere battery was suffi-
cient."' Modem law has followed suit and recognizes a suffi-
cient "force" when a there is a risk of death or serious bodily
194. Id.
195. HOLMES, supra note 156, at 42.
196. See supra notes 156-95 and accompanying text.
197. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *30.
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injury.1 98 The presence of this force alone, however, is not
enough.
A force is only coercive when it causes the person to act in a
certain way. For example, when a gang approaches a youth and
beats him until he joins the gang, that youth's decision to join
the gang may be coerced. Similarly, when gang leaders instruct
another gang member to steal and threaten to kill him if he
refuses, that theft may be coerced. Few would doubt that the
severity of these threats is sufficient. However, whether the above
two acts are, in fact, coerced ultimately depends on the individ-
ual. In both cases, the act is only coerced if the youth would not
have acted but for the forces present.
The strength of the threat and the predisposition of the per-
son threatened are necessary factors. Some people are more
resistant to threats than others. No matter how serious the
threat, if the individual did not feel threatened, then coercion is
lacking. Similarly, some people do not need the prodding of a
threat for them to act. No matter how great the threat, if the
person would have committed the act regardless of the accompa-
nying threat, then the act was not coerced. It follows, therefore,
that an act can be more or less coerced depending on the nature
of the threat, the fortitude of the individual to resist the threat,
and the individual's predisposition to comply absent the
threat.199
Coerced acts need not be involuntary acts.20 0 Beyond reflex
and unconscious acts, everything we do is voluntary in the sense
that we are consciously performing. Coercion defenses do not
deny the conscious performance of a crime, but, rather, they
seek to exculpate due to the mental state of the actor. The core
of such defenses is a defect of volition.201 The significance of this
defect is in its relation to the underlying rationales of criminal
law - reformation, rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribu-
tion.20 2 Examining how a coerced act should be punished
according to these various rationales should help expose the
proper scope of these defenses.
198. See infra notes 278-79 and accompanying text.
199. This gradation is valuable for deciding how much someone deserves
to be punished for committing a coerced crime.
200. ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 8 (1987). The MPC defines
involuntary acts to include: reflexes or convulsions; bodily movements during
unconsciousness or sleep; conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic
suggestion; and other bodily movement not the product of the effort or
determination of the actor. MPC, supra note 1, § 2.01(2).
201. WERTHEIMER, supra note 200, at 9.
202. Id. at 145.
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Under a reformation or rehabilitation theory of punish-
ment, the coerced actor may not warrant penalty; he is not a
good candidate to be either reformed or rehabilitated. Since the
criminal act is necessarily the product of force or threatened
force the likelihood that the individual would again commit such
a crime is small. Furthermore, the future commission of a simi-
lar crime is not under this individual's control. Since the initial
crime was the result of force, detaining or otherwise punishing
the person who committed the crime could not effect the extinc-
tion of his or her tendencies or disposition to commit a similar
criminal act. A coerced act is a type of one-time transgression
that justifiably would receive no punishment.
Similarly, the coerced actor does not warrant punishment to
deter future acts or actors. Granted, punishing a coerced actor
could deter to the extent it forewarns the actor and others that
no defense will lie. Such knowledge has some consequence in
both the actor's fortitude in resisting and in his refusal to posi-
tion himself in the line of likely coercive force. However, since a
coercion defense requires that the actor truly had no reasonable
choice but to commit the criminal act,20 3 any such warning, even
the threat of death,2" 4 may not suffice to discourage it. Thomas
Hobbes reasoned:
[N] o Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preserva-
tion. And supposing such a Law were obligatory; yet a man
would reason thus, If I [do] it not, I die presently; if I [do]
it, I die afterwards; therefore by doing it, there is time of
life gained; Nature therefore compels him to the fact.205
Encouraging resistance has no value in the context of legitimate
coercion claims since the threat that would need to be overcome
is a threat that a reasonable person could not resist. Punishment
could not effect his or her resolve to avoid a repeat offense.
Aside from reformation, rehabilitation, or deterrence spe-
cific analysis, consequentialist theory in general would argue
against the punishment of the coerced actor; this would not pro-
mote the overall good of society. From a utilitarian perspective,
the proper function of law is to augment the total happiness of
society - promote good and discourage evil. 206 Believing that
203. See infra notes 280-305, 356-64 and accompanying text.
204. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 52-53 (W. Hastie trans.,
Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1887).
205. THOMAS HOBBES, LEViATHAN 345-46 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968)
(emphasis omitted).
206. BENTHAM, supra note 160, at 170.
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all punishment is evil,2 °7 Jeremy Bentham reasoned that punish-
ment should not be inflicted when it would be inefficacious or
unprofitable because overall good would not be promoted.2 °8 In
the coercion context, punishment is both inefficacious and
unprofitable; it cannot prevent future similar acts and the evil
necessarily flowing from this punishment would exceed that of
the crime. If the coerced actor has no legitimate opportunity to
avoid the act, then he has, effectively, no choice in avoiding the
punishment and, therefore, the resulting harm. The threat of
punishment would be ineffective to prevent the act. If the crimi-
nal act cannot be discouraged, then punishment as a means for
deterrence is valueless and punishment is not warranted.
Furthermore, if criminal law imposed penalties in cases
where the criminal had no choice but to commit the crime, then
the meager good society may realize by punishing is more than
offset by the associated evil. In such cases, the normal good that
society would receive is minimized .by the implication that any
random member of society may be similarly coerced and pun-
ished despite their lack of criminal tendencies or desires. Society
should not convict when it cannot condemn.20 9 Society should
blame the wrongful act, but, in cases of coercion, it should not
blame the actor beyond his blameworthiness. If punishment
exceeds blameworthiness it does not promote overall happiness
and is, therefore, inappropriate.
According to retribution theory, the function of punishment
is to repudiate the rejection of moral community implicit in a
particular criminal act. Although an authentic coerced actor
cannot reasonably refuse the criminal act,210 he or she has com-
mitted a crime that wrongs its victim and society. The question is
whether punishing the coerced actor can negate this wrong.
Alternatively, does the coerced actor deserve to be punished?
The answer to both is no.
Since the coerced actor has no choice but to commit the
crime, casting blame upon him or her through punishment
would not revitalize society. Although society requires retribu-
tion for crime, such retribution is legitimate only to the extent
that it does not exceed culpability. Within the coercion context,
207. Id. Punishment, in itself, must be evil because it forces a restraint on
a person that is not freely chosen and a restriction of free choice and liberty is
something one naturally wants to avoid. This characterization is Benthamite;
however, the notion that punishment is something one naturally wants to avoid
is more general. See, e.g., Morris, supra note 190, at 98.
208. BENTHAM, supra note 160, at 171.
209. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 388.
210. See infra notes 280-305, 356-64 and accompanying text.
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the coerced actor has no legitimate choice in committing the
criminal act, he or she is a mere conduit for sapping social value
and is not blameworthy.
The coercive force or actor is the proper object of retribu-
tion;211 anything contrary would, so to speak, punish the gun
instead of the shooter for a killing. A gun stands in a similar
relation to the crime as does a coerced criminal; each is used
toward the criminal end of another being. The wrong caused by
crime may not be negated by punishing a criminal tool.
The above analogy is inexact. Unlike a gun, a coerced crimi-
nal can select the threat instead of the crime. This choice, how-
ever, is unreasonable. The role of the hero should never be
demanded. A true hero is so named because that person has
done something beyond the call of the ordinary. To place the req-
uisite standard of conduct at this level would demand from the
ordinary that which society must recognize as exceptional. 212
Such heroism is not demanded elsewhere in criminal law"1 and
it should not be expected in the face of legitimate coercive force.
Sentiment to expect heroism may rest on the rarity with which
such events occur and the reasonable belief that the average
member of society will not face such a difficult choice; it is mor-
ally incorrect nonetheless.
211. See infra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
212. See MPC, supra note 1, § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 375 ("The proper treatment
of the hero is not merely to withhold a social censure; it is to give him praise
and just reward."). Cf Regina v. Howe, 1 All E.R. 771, 779-80 (1987) ("I have
known in my own lifetime of too many acts of heroism by ordinary human
beings of no more than ordinary fortitude to regard a law as either 'just or
humane' which withdraws the protection of the criminal law from the innocent
victim and casts the cloak of its protection on the coward and the poltroon in
the name of a 'concession to human frailty.'") (Hailsham, LJ.).
° 213. In general, criminal sanctions are not imposed absent an overt act
(actus reus) except in specific situations where the law has placed an affirmative
duty to do something. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir.
1962) (failure to act may be criminal only: where a certain status relationship
exists between those involved; where statute imposes a duty to care for another;
where one has assumed a contractual duty to care for another; and where one
has voluntarily assumed the care of another and secluded that person from the
aid of others); People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1129 (Mich. 1907) (for
culpability to result from a failure to act, "the duty neglected must be a legal
duty, and not a mere moral obligation."). For more general discussions of the
duty to rescue and the legal demands for heroism, see John M. Adler, Relying
Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the Current State of
Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 Wis. L. REv. 867;
Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1993).
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Holmes recognized that, "criminal liability... is founded on
blameworthiness. 21 4 He also recognized that, "a law which pun-
ished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the average
member of the community would be too severe for that commu-
nity to bear."21' This conclusion and rationale is supported in
Holmes' reasoning on criminal law. He writes:
The degree of civilization which a people has reached, no
doubt, is marked by their anxiety to do as they would be
done by. It may be the destiny of man that the social
instincts shall grow to control his actions absolutely, even
in anti-social situations. But they have not yet done so, and
as the rules of law are or should be based upon a morality
which is generally accepted, no rule founded on a theory
of absolute unselfishness can be laid down without a
breach between law and working beliefs.216
Today, one-hundred and fifteen years after Holmes' observation,
the social instincts of man still do not completely control in anti-
social situations, nor should they be expected to. A hero is still a
hero; heroism is not the act of the ordinary.
The necessary fit between culpability and punishment com-
pels the conclusion that, regardless of any minimal ability to
negate wrong, a coerced person should not be punished for a
coerced crime. Under reformation, rehabilitation, deterrence,
or retribution theories, the presence of coercion demands that
no punishment follow. The difficulty remains, however, to apply
this principle in appropriate circumstances - distinguishing
those deserving of protection from the ranks of the blameworthy.
2. The Coerced Gang Member Scenario
In cases of coercion, the quest for conviction or acquittal
"on the merits" is valueless when the act is uncontested and the
circumstances are the only true point of inquiry. Society has a
genuine interest in combating gang violence, but it cannot legiti-
mately do so oblivious to or at the expense of the moral justifica-
tion for criminal punishment - moral culpability. Just as a non-
gang member may be coerced, so too may a gang member. Just
as a coerced non-gang member should not be punished, neither
should a coerced gang member. Indeed, a coerced gang mem-
ber may be the same as any other coerced actor in all respects
relevant to punishment. In the gang context, however, existing
214. HoLMEs, supra note 156, at 50.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 44.
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law does not sufficiently recognize defects in volition that may
lead to criminal acts, particularly when coercion is involved.2" 7
There is nothing unique about a gang member or gang
crime that would except him from the requirement that culpabil-
ity not be exceeded by punishment. So long as the volition to
join the gang is driven by a sufficient force or threat of force,
then the choice to join a gang may be coerced. So long as the
gang member's continued involvement in the gang is compelled
in a similar manner, then his continued involvement may be
coerced. And, finally, so long as the impetus for criminal activity
in the gang is the product of force or the threat of force, then
these crimes can be coerced.
The potential sources of these forces or threats of force war-
rant particular discussion. Few would deny the coercive potential
of a direct and concrete threat tied to a particular activity or inac-
tivity. For instance, if the gang member did not want to join the
gang, but was beaten or otherwise forced into submission,"1 if
any effort to leave the gang would be met with violence,2 1 9 or if
the refusal to commit a particular act would result in an attack,220
then the strength of the coercive force should not be doubted.
Less direct threats, however, should also be sufficient.
Coercion is dependent on the presence of an external force
compelling an action. From a theoretical standpoint, the source
of this threat should not alone defeat the strength of coercion
perceived. Particularly, there is nothing that would require the
threat to come from within the gang; a threat exterior to the
gang can compel gang affiliation as well. It should matter only
that the threatened harm is real and is sufficiently certain to
result.
A threat does not become less threatening when the source
is outside of the gang. For instance, when a neighborhood is
host to extensive gang violence, experience has shown that non-
gang members are often the victims. Gangs can help to ease this
threat because a gang member will have the support and protec-
tion of others; support and protection that is often unavailable
from more legitimate sources. Habitat is not always controllable
and taking steps to protect oneself (i.e.,joining a gang) deserves
special consideration when courts and society judge the culpabil-
ity of appropriate gang members. In the gang context, absence
217. See infra Part IV.
218. See supra notes 96-106 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 117-21, 135-36, 140 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 116-31, 141-42 and accompanying text.
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of free will may include a lack of reasonable alternatives to initial
and continued association in the gang.
In theory, the origination of the harm compelling gang asso-
ciation should not effect the viability of the threat; its only impli-
cation should be in the measurement of the force present. The
question, then, is whether we want this to make a difference.
The answer to this question, however, cannot be completely
divorced from the various justifications for punishment. In par-
ticular, if such external forces are not recognized then punish-
ment may be inflicted in situations where reformation,
rehabilitation, or deterrence theory would find that good is not
furthered and where retributivist theory may find that culpability
has been exceeded and punishment is not deserved. External
threats must be considered because they significantly affect the
decisions of youths to join gangs. The same analysis is appropri-
ate to the evaluation of threats compelling continued gang
involvement and criminal gang activity. Such neighborhood fac-
tors must be considered because they can coerce an action in the
sense that they are the cause of the otherwise criminal activity.
The crimes committed by gang members are not usually the
type included under the heading of strict-liability. Although the
association offenses of most anti-gang statutes may fall within this
category, other offenses such as theft or assault traditionally
require a guilty mind.221 Regardless, in theory, even for strict-
liability crimes, a coercion defense should apply. The purpose
behind strict-liability's imposition of criminal duty is to
encourage compliance with some prescribed norm in order to
promote a particular social goal.222 This purpose is denied if one
is coerced into violating the law; encouragement to act in a cer-
tain manner cannot hope to overcome a present, unreasonable
force or threat of force. Thus, failure to recognize the coercive
forces that may affect the culpability of gang members cannot be
excused as a sacrifice necessary for the growth and preservation
of society or by a blanket desire to suppress street gangs.
Society does need to stop gang activity, but punishing the
coerced gang member would not further this goal. The very fact
that he was coerced connotes that the situation, not the inclina-
tions of the individual, caused the crime. Punishing the individ-
ual will not suppress the environmental factors exterior to him.
The differences that the gang situation entails cannot make a
difference in determining just punishment.
221. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 260-61 (1952).
222. Id. at 255-56.
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Recognizing that sufficiently coerced street gang members
are not proper subjects for punishment, however, does not help
to divine those gang members deserving such classification. The
sufficiently coerced street gang criminal has not yet been pack-
aged as such. It is difficult to point to an existing case or model
because the incentive to come forward with the requisite quali-
ties has been lacking. Instead of viewing street gang criminals as
potentially deserving of compassion, criminal law has sought stif-
fer penalties to be applied without regard for the individual exi-
gencies of the gang member involved.22 Not surprising, when
gang members have advanced coercion claims, they have been
largely unsuccessful.224 The coerced gang member, however,
does exist.
When a gang member joins his gang under a reasonable fear
of bodily harm, from the gang itself or from the dangerous
nature of his environment, he should not be punished for his
mere membership. Further, so long as free choice in refraining
from criminal activity or from leaving the gang entirely is severely
limited, society cannot legitimately impose the full force of its
criminal sanctions. Although this contention may not attract
strong social support at first glance, it is, nonetheless, required in
a just society. This call for compassion should not be trouble-
some. So long as the appropriate individuals can be selected,
society must recognize the situation.
3. Coerced Gang Crime Will Be Punished
Excusing the actions of sufficiently coerced gang members
does not negate the wrong that these crimes inflict, however, the
wrong will not often go entirely unchecked. Most coerced gang
crimes will be punished, but it is the person or persons who
caused the crime, those responsible for coercing, who will
receive the penalty, not the person who is coerced. This is a
straightforward proposition which, in the gang situation, may not
be so simple.
In certain situations, the leadership or particular individuals
within a gang will coercively recruit the gang member and will
retain his allegiance through force or threat of force. This is the
easy case. The gang leadership or the individuals involved
should be punished for both the act of coercion and the crime
committed. Indeed, the anti-gang statutes of California and Indi-
223. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 122-25 (People v. Ganus), 126-31 (United States v.
Campbell) and accompany text; infra notes 291-98 (United States v. Smith),
306-08 (Regina v. Sharp) and accompanying text.
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ana specifically recognize that a gang member can coerce
another to join a gang and to remain in the gang. 25 If a gang
member can coerce it necessarily implies that another can be
coerced. It should also follow that a crime can be coerced
although these statutes do not address this situation.
Alternatively, when the youth joins a gang so as to provide
himself a measure of protection against an unreasonably danger-
ous community or when a gang member cannot leave the gang
because of a legitimate fear of retaliation or attack by a rival
gang, the selection of a person to punish is more difficult. It is
unclear exactly who should be punished in this situation. This
uncertainty and perhaps the conclusion that no one can be pun-
ished under such circumstances should be ameliorated by the
fact that these claims will likely be the most difficult to prove to
the necessary degree. These cases should also highlight to soci-
ety that such unreasonable situations do exist and that maybe it
is society and these situations that warrant the attention as well as
the coerced gang member involved.
Judge David Bazelon, addressing the necessity to punish
only to the extent of moral culpability, wrote:
I strongly suspect that those who fear that my emphasis on
moral culpability wouldjeopardize our safety are not realis-
tic .... [I]f community morality cannot condemn certain
dangerous actors - then those facts, and the values they
reflect, should be confronted. The real question it seems
to me, is how we can afford not to live up to our moral
pretenses and not to excuse unfree choices or non-
blameworthy acts.
226
Judge Bazelon's beliefs are quite appropriate to sum up the cir-
cumstances in which gang crime would and should not be
punished.
lV. CLASSIC COERCION DEFENSES OFFER No RELIEF
Society rightly mourns and consoles the innocent victims of
gang violence. However, it must make sure to capture the entire
band of victims in this empathy. Polite society may not want to
recognize the gang member victim, but he is a victim nonethe-
less. A gang member can be coerced just the same as an "ordi-
nary" citizen can be coerced. However, most legitimate gang
coercion claims simply cannot survive in the rigid climate of
225. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.26 (West Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
45-9-4 (Burns 1994).
226. Bazelon, supra note 4, at 398.
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existing coercion based defenses. So long as the criminal justice
system fails to take his peculiar circumstances into account, the
coerced gang member is victimized yet again.
There are two traditional coercion based defenses at com-
mon law: duress and necessity. Assuming that certain coerced
gang members deserve an affirmative defense to tailor their pun-
ishment more closely to their culpability, neither common law
defense is appropriate. Necessity will not be considered here
because it is not meant to cover the gang situation.227 Duress, on
the other hand, is designed to exculpate on certain occasions
when one is forced by another to commit a criminal act in fear of
one's personal safety. Duress, however, is not responsive to the
realities of the gang situation.
Discussing duress in general terms, Professor Joshua
Dressler pointed out the moral gap in existing law: "If... legal
doctrine ought to be, whenever possible, consistent with a coher-
ent moral theory, society's moral intuitions, and the emotions
that shape society's reactions to dilemmatic circumstances, cur-
rent duress law may fail this criteria."228 This may be even more
true in the context of coerced gang members. To its credit, how-
ever, classic duress does not miss by much. The purpose is well
formed, but the scope of its reach is inadequate. Exploring the
current confines of this defense will help illustrate its deficiencies
in the gang context and which of its facets need to be addressed
and improved to match culpability more accurately with
punishment.
A. Classic Duress
Unfortunately complicating this analysis, duress is subject to
jurisdictional differences. The core of the defense, however,
does not vary all that significantly in jurisdictions that have
retained relatively close ties to the common law of duress.
Although actual enunciations of duress standards or elements
may vary, the following discussion of elements underlies most
227. Essentially, "necessity" justifies an otherwise criminal act when the
actor is faced with two unreasonable alternatives and chooses the one that
produces the lesser harm. See MPC, supra note 1, § 3.02; WERTHEiMER, supra
note 200, at 150. Typically, the greater harm needs to be of natural cause (e.g.,
"a lightning storm forces [someone] to trespass on [another's] land in order to
seek safety"). Dressler, supra note 66, at 1348.
228. Dressler, supra note 66, at 1333.
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classic duress defenses.229 Where appropriate, significant juris-
dictional differences will be noted."'0
Traditionally, duress is an excuse as opposed to a justifica-
tion. 31  This characterization, however, is not universally
accepted; some state criminal codes 32 and scholars233 treat
duress as a justification instead. In the end, the difference
between 'Justification" and "excuse" relates primarily to the man-
ner in which society perceives the otherwise criminal act; both
exculpate the actor. An act is justified, "[w]hen the law tolerates,
permits, or actively encourages otherwise wrongful, socially
harmful conduct."23 4 An excuse, on the other hand, admits that
an act was wrong, but argues that the actor should not be pun-
ished.233 Duress rightly falls into the latter category.23 6 Gang
crime, committed by coerced gang members, is notjustified; it is
not tolerated, permitted, or encouraged. Gang crime is wrong
and its commission by a coerced actor does not change this eval-
uation. A coercion defense for the coerced gang member, as
with classic duress, seeks to excuse the actor not justify the act.
As it has been applied, a successful duress defense requires
that the defendant prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,237
that: (1) he was subjected to actual or threatened force at the
time of his illegal conduct; (2) this force or threat of force was of
such a nature to induce a well-founded fear of impending death
or serious bodily harm; (3) he had no reasonable opportunity to
229. The following analysis of classic duress primarily utilizes federal
decisions on the topic. Contrary to the vast majority of state legislatures, which
have codified the duress excuse, federal duress law remains entirely judge
made. For a state by state breakdown of duress requirements, see Laurie Kratky
Dor6, Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope: The Use of Duress in Defense of
Battered Offenders, 56 OHIo ST. L.J. 665 app. (1995).
230. In particular, the most significant divergence is in states that have
adopted duress standards similar to that of the MPC. MPC, supra note 1, § 2.09.
Due to the significance of these changes, it would be unreasonably disruptive,
at this point, to give MPC duress the attention that it deserves. For this
discussion, see infra notes 324-34 and accompanying text.
231. WERTHEIMER, supra note 200, at 146.
232. See, e.g., AKIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-412 (1989); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 704.10 (West 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.18(6) (West 1986).
233. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAw 433 (2d ed. 1986).
234. Dressler, supra note 66, at 1349 n.124.
235. GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 759 (1978).
236. For a thorough discussion of the distinctions between justification
and excuse and the proper placement of duress, see Dressler, supra note 66, at
1349-67.
237. United States v. Santos, 932 F.2d 244, 248 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 985 (1991); United States v. Christian, 843 F. Supp. 1000, 1004 (D. Md.),
aff'd 37 F.3d 1496 (4th Cir. 1994).
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escape the force or threat of force other than by engaging in the
unlawful activity;2 8 (4) he did not intentionally or recklessly or,
sometimes, negligently put himself in a position where he would
likely be compelled to commit criminal acts; 23 9 and, in some
cases, (5) he turn himself in as soon as a safe opportunity
arises240 or does not maintain the illegal activity any longer than
absolutely necessary. 41
Courts have strictly applied these elements and successful
duress defenses are rare.242 This is certainly due to many factors,
including: the all or nothing nature of classic duress,243 the sever-
ity of the threat required,2 4 and the fact that duress excuses a
238. United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1344 (2d Cir.) (first three
elements), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990). Most jurisdictions that follows
classic duress holds these first three elements in common. See Dor6, supra note
229, at 697-98.
239. Most jurisdictions hold that intentionally placing oneself in the
position where one would likely be the subject of coercion will defeat a duress
defense. There is definite disagreement, however, as to whether reckless
activity will suffice as well. See, e.g., Dor, supra note 229, app. (Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Washington
statutorily declare that recklessness will bar a duress defense). Mere negligence
will create a barrier in only a minority ofjurisdictions. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 103-A(3) (C) (West 1983); United States v. Singleton, 902 F.2d
471, 472 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 872 (1990); United States v. Gant, 691
F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 667
(2d Cir. 1979).
240. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 412-13 (1980) (usually applied
in prison escape cases).
241. United States v. Rifle, 28 F.3d 565, 569 (6th Cir. 1994).
242. See Dor6, supra note 229, at 747 & n.339; Dressler, supra note 66, at
1331-32; MPC, supra note 1, § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 379.
243. At the guilt phase there is no middle ground; lower levels of duress
than that required to acquit can never mitigate the offense to a lesser charge.
But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(3) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting a murder
charge to be reduced to manslaughter when the homicide is the product of
coercion); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.46 (West Supp. 1995) (permitting coercion
defense to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder). Imperfect
duress claims (actual duress insufficient to acquit) have been successful and
readily allowed in sentencing. See Dor6, supra note 229, at 732-34. Such use
could achieve roughly the same result (in terms of sentence received) as would
mitigation at the guilt phase. However, the two are not identical. The nature
of convictions (e.g., murder or manslaughter, rape or sexual assault) surely cast
different stigmas independent of the sentence received and with affects
reaching well beyond release from prison.
244. Regardless whether the criminal act compelled is minor (i.e., a
misdemeanor), classic duress requires a threat the produces a well founded fear
of death or serious bodily harm in order to excuse. It seems rational, however,
that a lesser threat would be sufficient to coerce a lesser crime. Nonetheless,
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person who has "rationally and intentionally chosen to commit
an unlawful act."2 45 Whatever the reason, the duress defendant
faces a distinctly hostile environment in which to assert his claim.
United States v. Bailey 46 exemplifies the strict, rigid, and,
often, distrustful environment that has developed around the
defense of duress and with which a coerced defendant must
cope. A thorough discussion of this decision will provide a help-
ful context to the remainder of this analysis.
In 1976, Clifford Bailey, James Cogdell, Ronald Cooley, and
Ralph Walker were all serving sentences for different and unre-
lated federal crimes at the New Detention Center of the District
of Columbia Jail.247 On August 26, 1976, these men removed a
bar from a window in the jail, climbed through the opening, and
escaped down a knotted bed sheet. Outside the facility, the four
parted company and remained at large for extended time peri-
ods ranging from one month to three-and-one-half months. 248
Once apprehended, all four men were tried for escape and
all four were convicted. At trial, each offered or attempted to
offer a defense of duress or necessity. These defenses were based
on alleged threatening conditions that existed at the jail - from
guard started fires in the cell block to guard inflicted beatings
and death threats. 249  The trial court, however, refused to
instruct the jury on duress as a matter of law, because the defend-
ants had not satisfied all of the required elements for such a
defense.2 ° The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, hold-
ing that the jury should have been allowed to consider evidence
regarding jail conditions. The Court of Appeals reasoned that
such evidence was relevant for determining whether the requisite
intent to escape was present to sustain a conviction or whether
the defendants were merely extricating themselves from unrea-
sonable conditions unrelated to confinement.251
classic duress does not make this distinction; "any proportionality or 'sliding
scale' analysis based on the severity of the threat compared to that of the
offense committed," Dor6, supra note 229, at 700, is not permitted. But see IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-41-3-8 (Burns 1994) (requiring only "force" or "threat of force"
for a duress defense to a non-felony); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05 (West 1994)
(same).
245. Dor6, supra note 229, at 747. See also Dressler, supra note 66, at 1359-
60.
246. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
247. United States v. Bailey, 585 F.2d 1087, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
248. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 396.
249. Id. at 398.
250. Id. at 399-400 (according to the district court, the defendants had
not turned themselves in after they had escaped their coercive conditions).
251. Id. at 401-02.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari and Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, reinstated the trial court's deci-
sion.252 He disagreed with the Court of Appeals' "heightened
standard of culpability" and "narrow definition of confine-
ment, , S 25and quickly rejected its reasons for reversing the trial
court as a matter of statutory interpretation. Justice Rehnquist
then examined the sufficiency of the defendants' evidence as
related to the defense of duress so as to determine whether ajury
instruction on duress should have been given. In particular, and
more important for this discussion, he applied the defendants'
claims and evidence presented to the classic elements of duress.
The majority found that the defendants had not satisfied the
required elements and, thus, had significantly fallen short of a
duress defense. Specifically, they had not turned themselves in
to the authorities once they had removed themselves from the
alleged harm.254 Since the defendants failed to offer evidence
that would satisfy all the required elements of duress, the trial
court had properly refused to instruct the jury on such a
defense.255
Curiously, the defendants had presented evidence that
should have remedied this flaw. Each contended that he feared
being returned to the same jail as before and subjected to the
same conditions and threats and, furthermore, to retaliation for
his escape.256 Essentially, each had claimed that the threats had
not yet ceased. The majority, however, discounted this informa-
tion, stating that, "[v] ague and necessarily self-serving statements
of defendants or witnesses as to future good intentions or ambig-
uous conduct simply do not support a finding of this element of
the defense."257 Surprisingly, Justice Rehnquist prefaced this
statement by reaffirming that,
[t]he Anglo-Saxon tradition of criminal justice, embodied
in the United States Constitution and in federal statutes,
makes jurors the judges of the credibility of testimony
offered by witnesses. It is for them, generally, and not for
appellate courts, to say that a particular witness spoke the
truth or fabricated a cock-and-bull story.258
This function of the jury is essential to its role in the judicial
process. Indeed, the jury's primary role is fact finder. Although
252. Id. at 417.
253. Id. at 408.
254. Id. at 415.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 429-30 nn.7-9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 415.
258. Id. at 414-15.
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the majority accents the primacy of the jury's discretion in this
regard, it seems to have limited the scope of evidence relevant
for the jury's consideration. If nothing more, the majority surely
expressed its distrust of the duress claims of these particular
defendants.
Justice Blackmun dissented at length and was joined by jus-
tice Brennan. The main point of Justice Blackmun's dissent was
that he would have allowed the jury to consider the duress
defense; he recognized that the fears the defendants expressed
about returning to custody could be legitimate and that in some
cases they surely were.259 Justice Blackmun believed that, "[i] t is
society's responsibility to protect the life and health of its prison-
ers."2 60 Perhaps most important and relevant to the topic of this
Article, he observed:
The real question presented in this case is whether the
prisoner should be punished for helping to extricate him-
self from a situation where society has abdicated com-
pletely its basic responsibility for providing an
environment free of life-threatening conditions such as
beatings, fires, lack of essential medical care, and sexual
attacks.261
The jury, having considered all the evidence, not an appellate
court having merely read the record, is surely in a better position
to determine the legitimacy of the defendants' claims - to
determine whether society has abdicated its protection responsi-
bilities. "This is routine grist for the jury mill and the jury usually
is able to sort out the fabricated and the incredible." 6' Thejury,
not the judge, is the conscience of society. 6'
Gang members urging duress as a defense to their crimes,
perhaps even more so than the defendants in Bailey, face the dis-
trust and rigidity of the judicial system. Prosecutors frequently
target gang members for vigorous prosecution2 64 and judges
often look to gang affiliation as an aggravating factor at sentenc-
ing.265 If a jury, after hearing all the evidence relating to coer-
cion, also determines that the gang member deserves to be
259. Id. at 421-22, 427 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
260. Id. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
261. Id. at 424-25 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 432 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264. CONLY, supra note 5, at 53-54; Finley, supra note 33, at 55.
265. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22 (West Supp. 1995); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 705, paras. 405/5-4(3.1)-(3.3), ch. 730, para. 5/5-5-3(c) (2) (J) (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1995); State v. Johnson, 873 P.2d 514 (Wash. 1994). See also supra
notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
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punished then he can expect no more. The jury should be the
"conscience of society" and should decide which claims are in
fact legitimate.
Unfortunately, although the sufficiently coerced gang mem-
ber defendant deserves to be excused, he will not likely be able to
present his coercion claim to a jury. In gang situations, except-
ing very rare and unreasonably narrow circumstances, the classic
defense of duress simply will not work. This is a legal conclusion
recognizing that one or more of the elements will probably be
lacking. If only one element is missing, the trial judge should
not burden the jury with evidence regarding any of the elements
and need not instruct the jury on the defense.2  Consequently,
classic duress is not a viable plea for the coerced gang member;
he will not likely reach the jury. A perusal of the five required
elements of classic duress should make this point abundantly
clear.
1. Actual or Threatened Force at the Time of the Crime
This element of the duress defense is often termed immedi-
acy, imminency, or impendency and has been strictly applied by
the courts. Holding steadfast to the rationale behind this ele-
ment - denying relief for elusive threats "in the air" and assur-
ing "the existence of a causal connection between the threat and
the wrongful act"2 67 - courts have held that this element is satis-
fied only in cases where the threatened harm accompanied the
defendant to the crime scene and was ready or threatened to
proceed should the defendant renounce the criminal design.2
In gang prosecutions, especially under anti-gang statutes
that provide special criminal counts for crimes in furtherance of
the gang, this element could prove a difficult hurdle to clear. At
its most extreme, satisfying this element would require the
coerced member to prove that a gun or other harmful threat
stood ever-ready to strike him should he ever renounce the crim-
inal plan. Since most gang statute violations are products of
membership, to end such a crime the member must leave the
gang. Further, immediacy would require the coerced gang mem-
ber to renounce his allegiance as soon as the forces inducing
266. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 415-16; United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324,
1343-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990); United States v. Karr, 742
F.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1984); United States v. Campbell, 609 F.2d 922, 924 (8th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 918 (1980).
267. Dressier, supra note 66, at 1340.
268. See United States v. Brooks, No. 92-50296, 1993 WL 455170, at *2
(9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1993); United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815, 821 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850 (1982).
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membership subside. Any delay would be unjustified because
the threat would no longer be immediate. The gang member
could be responsible under these statutes for any crime he com-
mitted in the interim between the removal of the compelling
threat and his departure from the gang. If the threat ever sub-
sided, then there would no longer be a reason to be in the gang.
Unfortunately, what classic duress views as an immediate threat
does not jibe with the subtleties of gang coercion. If the gang's
policy is to reprimand reactively, as is the Imperial Gangster Dis-
ciples',269 the requisite immediacy is lacking. To an even greater
extent, if protection needs mandate gang participation, classic
duress immediacy is not implicated at all.
The foregoing analysis applies to individual criminal events
as well. Analysis of gang culture reveals that gangs rarely coerce
proactively, but, more often, reactively.270 The threat does not
usually accompany the actor, but looms to respond to errors and
fouls against the gang and its directives. These threats are less
than immediate and, consequently, fail the first element of clas-
sic duress even though a reasonable person would be likely to
experience legitimate apprehension when confronted with such
legitimate pressures.
Not surprisingly, the immediacy requirement is not satisfied
by generalized fears of retaliation. 71 Instead, a specific threat
inducing a particular act is necessary. 72 Although not represen-
tative of the coerced gang member scenario central to this Arti-
cle, United States v. Brooks17 is illustrative of the types of gang
fears that are insufficient to satisfy the immediacy requirement of
classic duress. Ronnie Brooks was convicted for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. At trial, Brooks presented evidence
about the dangers posed by gang related violence in his neigh-
borhood and his fears of unidentified threats to his life.27 4 The
trial court, however, refused to instruct the jury on duress or
necessity because such fears and threats were not immediate
threats as required by the defense. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed.27 5
269. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
270. See generally supra notes 114-44 and accompanying text.
271. See Dor6, supra note 229, at 701-02; United States v. Villegas, 899
F.2d 1324, 1344 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990).
272. See United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1182 (2d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Jennell, 749 F.2d 1302, 1305 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 837 (1985); United States v. Agard, 605 F.2d 665, 668 (2d Cir. 1979); State
v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755, 761 (NJ. 1977).
273. No. 92-50296, 1993 WL 455170, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 1993).
274. Id. at *2.
275. Id.
1996]
192 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 10
The immediacy element of classic duress does not encom-
pass appropriate cases in the gang context where the threat,
although very real, is less than immediate. A threat is no less com-
pelling, or coercive, when set up to act in an hour or a day or a
week. Under the classic application of duress, the fear of being
"eight-balled," present in Helton v. State,276 would not satisfy the
immediacy requirement, yet there is a real threat to members
who want to leave this gang or want to abstain from particular
gang activities.
The narrow manner in which the immediacy requirement
has been interpreted has prevented classic duress from exculpat-
ing in cases of genuine threat; it is especially problematic in gang
situations. If "eight-balling" is not an "immediate" threat, surely,
the gang member who joins to protect himself in his community
does not face an immediate threat. This is troubling; the genu-
ine nature of the threatened harm should satisfy in either of
these cases. With regards to "eight-balling," whether the harm
occurs immediately upon refusing some gang requisite or later
that day or week does not alter or lessen the force or reality of
the beating. The same is true when one joins a gang to protect
himself in the community. So long as the contemplated harm is
reasonably likely to occur, a mere postponement should not
effect the quality of its compulsion.
The immediacy requirement is founded upon a pragmatic
need to discourage defenses based on nebulous threats in the air.
In the gang context, however, this threat is often not nebulous
and, although sometimes in the air, it can be readily verified by
reference to those who previously played the role of the "hero."
Provided adequate proof is made regarding the operation and
certainty of a threat, then "threats in the air" concerns should
not pose a legitimate bar to the protection of a coercion defense.
When gang leaders threaten the recruit or his family with physi-
cal violence or experience has shown the danger in refusing
gang membership, then that recruit's subsequent membership is
as coerced as when the gang leaders come over with a gun and
physically seize him. If a gang member waits for a threat in the
air to become immediate, as contemplated by classic duress, this
will usually mean that he is about to be beaten or killed,
immediately.
276. 624 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). See supra notes 117-21 and
accompanying text.
277. The American Law Institute corrected this seeming impropriety by
abolishing the immediacy requirement when it drafted the MPC section on
duress. The MPC refers atemporally to force and threatened force. See MPC,
supra note 1, § 2.09. See also infra notes 324-28 and accompanying text.
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Failing this element alone will preclude a duress acquittal.
Thus, although he may have satisfied the purpose behind this
element, the street gang defendant will likely have already lost. If
the threat is real, the law should recognize it. Current duress law
does not.
2. Well Founded Fear of Death or Serious Bodily Harm
The seriousness of an alleged coercive threat is measured by
an objective standard - would a reasonable person fear impend-
ing death or serious bodily harm? This is a standard that would
not seem to cause problems for gang member defendants, at
least in the nature of the harm threatened.
Much gang violence (i.e., drive by shootings, armed robbery,
murder, group violence in general) lends empirical seriousness
and objective reasonableness to the fears associated with gang
threats. This is true whether or not the threats induced member-
ship or activity or both. This, of course, assumes certain charac-
teristics of recruitment related threats: one, that they are similar
in magnitude to the outward violent manifestations of the gang;
two, that the gang has carried out threatened violence on its
potential members in the past. Looking at People v. Cruz278 and
Helton,2 7 9 these assumptions surely are not baseless. Further,
with the fear and threat society generally perceives in gangs, it
would be hypocritical to conclude that gang members could not
fear this violence as well.
Cruz and Helton dealt with particularly directed threats, how-
ever, coercive forces may be more general as well. In some cases,
a gang member may be driven to gang activity by the dangerous-
ness of his environment (in the neighborhood or the school)
and the absence of police and other protection. Even here, the
nature of the threatened harm, again gang violence, would not
likely pose significant difficulties. In this respect, it is the same
danger, the same violence, that is relevant, the focus is simply on
the entire community instead of on an individual coercive actor.
In general, the nature of gang violence is amenable to this
element. That is to say, this component of duress does not effec-
tively preclude the street gang defendant. It is only one of five
elements, however, and does not of itself establish a defense.
278. 518 N.E.2d 320 (IIl. Ct. App. 1987) (recruiting by shooting), cert.
denied, 526 N.E.2d 834 (Il. 1988). See also supra notes 99-101 and accompanying
text.
279. 624 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) ("eight-balling"). See supra
notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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3. No Reasonable Means to Escape the Threatened Harm and
Not Break the Law
According to the United States Supreme Court, in Bailey,2 8 °
if there is any way to avoid the criminal act and also avoid the
threatened harm, then the defense of duress will fail. The pur-
pose behind this element is to distinguish cases in which there is
no choice but to commit the crime and cases in which an alterna-
tive choice, albeit difficult, can be made. This philosophy is
clearly expressed by the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Lewis 81
where the court said:
The [duress defense] does not arise from a 'choice' of sev-
eral sources of action; it is instead based on a real emer-
gency. It may be asserted only by a defendant who was
confronted with a crisis as a personal danger, a crisis that
did not permit a selection from among several solutions,
some of which would not have involved criminal acts.282
Obviously, if it is not reasonable to fear the threatened harm
(e.g., the threat is not likely to be carried out or escape is avail-
able), then the reasonable choice is simply to ignore the threat.
Deciding which threats are reasonably feared and which are not,
however, is a difficult and precarious task for one facing the
threat. If a real threat is mistakenly perceived as uncompelling,
then the threatened person will likely receive a devastating harm.
However, if the threatened person acts criminally in response to
an unreasonable threat, then the duress defense will not be avail-
able. Perhaps easing the burden of selection,283 if the circum-
stances surrounding the threat allow, case law on duress often
requires the defendant to contact the police before engaging in
the criminal act.284
Although police involvement is theoretically available in
most gang crime situations, this alternative may not be reason-
able for the coerced gang member. To the credit of the duress
defense, there are two generally recognized exceptions to calling
280. 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (considered this third element the
keystone of the analysis).
281. 628 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 924 (1981).
282. Id. at 1279.
283. It is uncertain whether the requirement to contact the police
complicates the choice of the threatened person, by placing another obstacle in
the path of a successful duress defense, or relieves the burden of deciding
which threat is or is not reasonable to fear.
284. United States v. Alzate, 47 F.3d 1103 (11th Cir. 1995); R.I.
Recreation Center v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 177 F.2d 603, 605 (1st Cir.
1949); United States v. Christian, 843 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (D. Md.), aff'd, 37
F.3d 1496 (4th Cir. 1994).
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the police; a course of action that has proven futile need not be
pursued nor must an alternative that is unreasonable under the
circumstances. Both exceptions are applicable in the gang
situation.
First, if experience has shown that it is futile to pursue a par-
ticular course of action (e.g., calling the police) to avoid a threat
then it need not be attempted. s5 In heavily gang controlled
neighborhoods the police do not actively and, certainly, do not
zealously patrol the area.286 In a panel discussion of a group of
five gang members living in the Cabrini Green Housing Project
in Chicago, the gang members said that the police did not
attempt to control the violence. Paraphrasing their response:
you know who the police are (whether in uniform or not)
because when gun shots sound, they are the first ones running in
the opposite direction. 8 7 If previous calls for help or complaints
about unruliness or violence have received no serious response,
one threatened need not call the police to relate the present
threat. Unfortunately, courts have limited the value of this
exception through narrow application.
For example, in United States v. Gant,288 the Fifth Circuit
found a lack of futility as a matter of law in rather disconcerting
circumstances. In this case, Edgar Gant was confronted in his
store by two men he had reason to suspect were going to rob
him. Gant retreated to a supply room and emerged with a gun to
defend himself. He was immediately arrested by the two men -
who happened to be police officers - for being a felon in pos-
session of a firearm. 289 Despite Gant's claim that the police had
been slow to respond to a previous robbery at his store, the Fifth
Circuit held that this neglect did not establish the necessary pat-
tern of futility.
290
In the gang context, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v.
Smith,29 reaffirmed this tight grip on the futility exception. At
his trial for various drug trafficking charges, Brandon Smith
285. United States v. Gant, 691 F.2d 1159, 1164 (5th Cir. 1982).
286. See generally CONLY, supra note 5, at 8 ("In a gang community,
residents are isolated from traditional institutions such as schools and law
enforcement .... ").
287. Panel Discussion, supra note 147.
288. 691 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1982).
289. Id. at 1162.
290. Id. at 1164. See also United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 873-74 (10th
Cir. 1990) (alleged failure of the police to respond to unrelated matters did not
excuse defendant from contacting the police regarding coercive threats), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 419 (1994).
291. 63 F.3d 956 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, Nov. 14, 1995 (No.
95-6751).
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offered a duress defense. Specifically, he claimed that a gang
called the VLBs had been threatening his life, had delivered
drugs to his home, and, since he was living in their territory, had
demanded that he sell the drugs for the gang.292 The trial judge,
however, refused to instruct the jury on this defense29 and Smith
was convicted.294 The Tenth Circuit affirmed this decision since
it believed that Smith could have phoned the police before the
drugs had been delivered to his home. 95 Furthermore, even if
Smith believed, as he contended at trial, that the police would
not have responded to his problem, such amorphous beliefs
would be insufficient to satisfy the futility exception.296
Second, even if there is no experience of futility, if an alter-
native is simply unreasonable under the circumstances there is
no need to attempt it. 29 7 Akin to the previous exception, it may
not be reasonable for a threatened recruit to call the police if he
has had no prior, positive dealings with the police. This conclu-
sion is buttressed by a fair analysis of the perilous position in
which a gang recruit may find himself. Police receptivity to a
gang member seeking protection is doubtful. The police are not
likely to take the complaint seriously, especially in light of recent
legislation that, essentially, makes gang membership illegal. It is
not reasonable for a recruit to gamble his safety on the question-
able response of the police and, in the process, subject himself to
potential criminal prosecution. Furthermore, even if the police
took the claim seriously, their ability to sufficiently protect the
recruit is suspect. To protect the recruit, the police would, essen-
tially, have to fight the gang. Since gangs are organized in vari-
ous structures, focusing on a few leaders or even all the leaders of
any one clique may not subdue the entire gang. 98 It is not rea-
sonable to risk being "eight-balled," as was the case in Helton,2 9 9
or worse, in hopes that the police will believe you and then fight
the gang for you.
Unlike the first exception, however, recent case law on
unreasonable alternatives gives some hope to the coerced gang
member. In United States v. Riffe,3°° Leonard Riffe was convicted
292. Id. at 960, 966.
293. Id. at 965.
294. Id. at 959.
295. Id. at 966.
296. See id. at 967 n.5.
297. United States v. Rifle, 28 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 1994).
298. CONLY, supra note 5, at 10.
299. 624 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). See supra notes 117-21 and
accompanying text.
300. 28 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 1994).
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for conspiracy to distribute marijuana while in prison and for aid-
ing and abetting the use of the mail to facilitate the distribution
of marijuana.3" 1 At his trial, Rifle pursued a duress defense and
offered evidence showing that he was under the threat of imme-
diate harm - a threat of death - should he ever cease helping
in the sale of these drugs.3" 2 The district court refused to pres-
ent this defense to the jury; since Rifle had not first sought the
protection of prison officials the defense of duress was per se
unavailable. 33 The Sixth Circuit, however, agreed with Rifle that
disclosure to the prison authorities would not have been reason-
able because Rifle had a well founded fear that the prison would
not have been able to protect him from the threatened harm.30 4
In applying this exception to duress' strict requirements, the
Sixth Circuit recognized that in such lawless situations, seeking
help from the prison guards would likely have subjected Rifle to
even greater risk and should not be required as a per se threshold
to a duress defense.3 °5
Provided the coerced gang member can satisfy one of these
exceptions, the police need not be contacted. The gang situa-
tion seems to argue that the police are not a reasonable alterna-
tive, however, it is questionable whether courts will hold this to
be the case. The decision is necessarily factually intensive.
The purpose of this element is valid. A defendant should be
required to show that he had no reasonable alternative but to
commit the crime. However, in the gang context, although the
ability to avoid the crime may often be limited and unreasonable,
case law (Riffe excluded) and the tendency of courts to apply this
element strictly make it unlikely that the typical coerced street
gang defendant will satisfy this element. Furthermore, even if a
particular situation affords the street gang criminal the opportu-
nity to contact the police, the value in avoiding the harm is mini-
mal. Unlike more traditional duress scenarios, the coercive force
of a gang is not fleeting. The gang is not likely to disappear and
even if the police are summoned they will rarely, if ever, be able
to permanently relieve the pressure.
301. Id. at 566.
302. Id. at 568.
303. Id. at 568-69.
304. Id. at 570.
305. Id.
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4. Did Not Intentionally, Recklessly, or Negligently Place
Oneself in a Position Where One Would be the
Likely Subject of Coercion
Coming to the coercive force or intentionally placing one-
self in the path of coercion will, by itself, defeat a duress claim.
The criminal law has developed this element to prevent criminals
from voluntarily joining conspiracies or associating with known
criminals and then claiming that their subsequent criminal activ-
ity was coerced. It places the initial responsibility to avoid such
dangerous environments on the individual who wants to assert
duress as a defense.
In the gang context, a gang member would fail this require-
ment if he voluntarilyjoined the gang in the true sense of "volun-
tarily." In Regina v. Sharp,3 °6 the English courts addressed this
very situation. In this case, David Sharp, a gang member, urged
duress as a defense to charges of murder and robbery. The trial
judge refused to hear evidence on this matter, however, ruling,
"that because he had voluntarily joined the gang in the first
place, the defense of duress was not available to him."3 ° 7 On
appeal, Lord ChiefJustice Lane summed up the rationale for this
decision:
[W]here a person has voluntarily, and with knowledge of
its nature, joined a criminal organisation or gang which he
knew might bring pressure on him to commit an offence
and was an active member when he was put under such
pressure, he cannot avail himself of the defence of
duress.3 08
The appellate court agreed with the trial court and affirmed its
decision to exclude any evidence relating to a duress defense.
Recognizing this limitation in the law of duress is appropri-
ate; the relevant consideration for the present discussion, how-
ever, is the situation where the gang member did not freely
choose tojoin the gang. Lord ChiefJustice Lane recognized this
distinction as well, commenting that if the member were coerced
(under the typical standards of duress) into joining the gang,
then duress may apply.3 0 9 He expressed, however, his hesitance
306. 1 Q.B. 853 (1987). For an excellent discussion of this case, see
Conor Gearty, Duress - Members of Giminal Organisations and Gangs, 46
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 379 (1987).
307. Gearty, supra note 306, at 380. See also Fry v. State, 440 N.E.2d 1133,
1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (duress defense not available to gang member
because he recklessly exposed himself to threats by joining a gang).
308. Gearty, supra note 306, at 380.
309. Id.
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in believing that such a member would lack the ability to escape
the control of such a gang.S3 10
Lord Chief Justice Lane is surely correct in saying that
coerced gang membership would satisfy the requirement that the
proponent of the duress defense did not intentionally, recklessly,
or negligently subject himself to the coercive force of the gang.
If the gang member did not voluntarily join the gang, he should
not have difficulty with this element. This, however, is not so
broad a concession as to encompass those cases in which the
coercive force is not specifically directed at a particular recruit.
It leaves open the question whether membership is sufficiently
coerced when a gang member did not have a real choice in join-
ing in the sense that he would be subject to a greater and unbear-
able threat of harm by living in his community or attending
school without any gang affiliation.
It is uncertain how classic duress would address such less
direct threats. Most likely, the same five element analysis that is
required of a duress defense generally would be required to
determine whether such associations are sufficiently coerced.
For the same reasons that duress will not work for most gang
crimes, the defense also will not likely sanction such member-
ship. This may not, however, be an appropriate response. If
gang membership is, in fact, caused by such forces, then gang
membership is not really voluntary and the gang member is not
"intentionally" placing himself in the path of coercive force; the
appropriate gang member is not placing himself in the coercive
environment. Likewise, these less direct threats should not
approach a level of recklessness or negligence. The context in
which a gang member faces coercive forces is often his neighbor-
hood or his school. Certainly, his placement in the line of such
difficulties should not reach the level of recklessness or negli-
gence since these factors are, as in the case of specifically
directed threats, out of his control. Certainly, being unfortunate
enough to live in gang controlled territory or going to a school
that is more a war zone than a learning institute is completely
innocuous. Blame should not be placed on, or more correctly
defense denied to, someone based on his address and school
district.
In a related matter, possessing qualities that a gang might
value would not likely be considered negligent or reckless in so
far as attracting the attention of gang recruiters. Being a tough
guy or a good fighter should not matter. So much is obvious.
Basic freedom, surely does not place a duty on gang prospects to
310. Id. at 381.
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maintain passive or benevolent personalities. It certainly does
not mandate a fragile physique.
An interesting and more borderline case regarding this ele-
ment of classic duress may lie with gang recruits who have previ-
ous criminal, perhaps violent, histories. A recruit has some
control over his previous criminal record and criminal activity
and an argument could be made that the propensity of these
activities to attract the attention of street gangs could be consid-
ered negligent or reckless. Drawing this conclusion would
require some common knowledge that gangs recruit primarily
criminal actors or, at least, a substantial number of criminal
actors because of their past activity.311 This information, how-
ever, is not available and the premise is doubtful.
According to a recent study, gang members, before they
enter gangs, do not have significantly higher delinquency rates
than non-gang members, although it is true that gang members
are more criminally disposed than non-gang members once they
are within the gang.31 This study supports the conclusion that it
is the gang context and not the criminal tendencies of the indi-
vidual member that promotes delinquency. 13 This relationship
seems to hold at the culmination of gang affiliation as well. Mal-
colm W. Klein, studying age in its relationship to gang involve-
ment, found no correlation between adolescent gang
involvement and criminal activity as an adult.314 Furthermore, so
long as the criminal system recognizes a duress defense for
prison escape under the conditions of Bailey,3 15 where the pris-
oner had to commit a conscious criminal act to be incarcerated,
311. If gangs do select recruits based on previous criminal activity and a
reasonable person would know that this is the case, then such previous criminal
activity could be regarded as negligent in so far as attracting the attention of
gang recruiters. Alternatively, if the individual knows that gangs recruit based
on past criminal activity and he consciously disregards this fact, then he could
be considered reckless.
312. Terence P. Thornberry et al., The Role ofjuvenile Gangs in Facilitating
Delinquent Behavior, 30 J. RES. IN CRIME & DELINQ. 55, 68-69 (1993). Cf
Williams, supra note 13, at 88 ("Most gang-involved youths come from violent
backgrounds and find a certain attraction to gang violence.").
313. Thornbeiry et al., supra note 312, at 69 (this study does not attempt
to examine the reasons for the increased delinquency of gang members).
314. See MALCOLM W. KLEIN, STREET GANGS AND STREET WORKERS 103-39
(1971). Although Klein conducted his research nearly a quarter-century ago,
his conclusions were noted and his major premises were re-analyzed and
undisturbed in Lasley, supra note 19, at 436.
315. See generally United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1980) (duress
defense available in cases of prison escape provided all classic elements are
satisfied).
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the unconvicted or, even, convicted criminal acts of a gang
recruit cannot of themselves preclude an excuse defense.
Although individual characteristics will not likely reach a
level of recklessness or negligence necessary to defeat a duress
defense, presumably the gang member will need to show specific
membership inducing threats. The influence of this element in
the gang context, therefore, would be to exclude from the duress
defense all but those members who were specifically compelled
to join the gang.
5. Surrender as Soon as a Safe Opportunity Arises
This element was discussed extensively in Bailey, 16 and will
not be rehashed here, except to say that the requirement to sur-
render is applicable in all cases of duress, not merely prison
escape. To satisfy this element, the coerced actor must surrender
to the police after the commission of the crime and the removal
of the threatened force or must cease the criminal activity as
soon as a safe opportunity arises. This element rests quite
securely on the premise that if the coerced actor would not have
committed the crime but for the presence of threats, then he
should naturally cease such activity as soon as the threats subside.
If a gang member has committed a criminal act, not only
does he face that offense, but he also may face another individual
offense or aggravating factor based on his gang affiliation. Thus,
the coerced gang member's duty with respect to this element
may be two-fold. The gang member would not only need to turn
himself in to the police as soon as the immediate threat subsided,
but renounce gang membership as well. In the context of gang
crime, this element of duress coincides well with the immediacy
element described above."1 7 These affirmative requirements,
however, could have dire consequences for coerced gang
members.
First, these requirements assume that the police would be
receptive to the gang member's claims. Although there does not
seem to be any study on the matter, common sense suggests legit-
imate pessimism that a gang member would receive a favorable
police response to his turning himself in, admitting gang mem-
bership and a particular crime, and soliciting compassion
because he claims he was coerced. The most likely result of such
action, with the current state of the law, is an arrest, a confession,
and a not too distant conviction.
316. Id. at 415. See also supra notes 247-63 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 267-77 and accompanying text.
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Second, there is no safety incentive in surrender. In the typ-
ical coercion case, surrender has some valuable consequence for
the coerced actor. In many situations, it allows the actor to
escape or seek protection from those forcing his hand. Even in
the context of prison escape, surrender highlights the prisoner's
unconscionable plight. In the gang context, with the existing
state of the law, surrender has no attractive consequence for the
unwilling actor. If he tries to avail himself of a duress defense
and turns himself in, the coerced gang member faces a substan-
tial risk of gang reprisal. The neighborhood would be even more
hostile to a traitor gang member than the environment that pre-
cipitated membership in the first place. Furthermore, gangs are
different from other coercive actors. The police, simply, cannot
protect the complaining gang member from his gang as they
would be able to protect most other non-gang coerced actors
from their respective threats. Specifically, the police cannot stop
or subdue the threat by arresting one or a few people.31 Police
custody, aside from some form of witness protection program,
would be less than -ideal as well. Since street and prison gangs
are significant power centers on both sides of the prison walls,319
the security gained from incarceration may be no greater than
the security in the neighborhood. 2 These difficulties are pres-
ent regardless of whether the police are receptive to the recruit's
claim.
The typical duress victim, although facing a significant hur-
dle in proving his claim, has incentive to turn himself in because
the import of his claim will not be summarily dismissed. Each
gang member, on the other hand, is the titular focus of public
fear, condemnation, and attack. So long as their is no defense to
aid the coerced gang member in his legal battles and no social
program to relocate the recruit to a safe environment, the police,
society, and the gang renders the affirmative requirement of this
element unrealistic in the gang context. As the law of duress cur-
rently exists, the surrender element may require nothing short of
martyrdom for coerced gang recruits.
One final hurdle, perhaps related to this requirement of
martyrdom, deserves mention here. That is, most classic duress
jurisdictions refuse the defense, as a matter of law, when homi-
318. CONLY, supra note 5, at 10, 46 (targeting a few key members or
leaders does not result in the reduction or destruction of gang activity). See also
JANKoWsKI, supra note 50, at 265.
319. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
320. See, e.g., People v. Ganus, 594 N.E.2d 211, 214 (111. 1992) (victim
killed inside prison in retaliation for raping a friend of the Latin Kings prior to
conviction), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1055 (1993).
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cide is involved. No matter what the alternative, if any, murder is
never excused. The inequity of this per se rule is perhaps best illus-
trated by Regina v. Dudley and Stephens. 2 ' Although this was tech-
nically a justification case the principle is equally applicable to
cases of duress.
In Dudley and Stephens, four sailors, Tom Dudley, Edwin Ste-
phens, Ned Brooks, and Richard Parker, were adrift on the open
sea about 1600 miles from the Cape of Good Hope after a storm
had destroyed their main vessel. They consumed their meager
supplies after only three days, then drifted at sea for seventeen
more eating only a small turtle and drinking no water. The
youngest, Parker, lay sick and close to death on the floor of the
boat; he had been drinking sea water and was in worse condition
than the others. Approaching starvation and dehydration him-
self, Dudley told the others that he believed none would survive
to rescue unless one was sacrificed and the others feasted on his
body. Dudley and Stephens believed that Parker would not sur-
vive regardless and selected him for slaughter. The fourth sailor,
Brooks, did not consent to this scheme although he did partake
of Parker's body once Dudley had killed him. Four days later,
having already consumed much of Parker's flesh and blood, the
remaining three men were rescued. 22
Despite the circumstances, Dudley and Stephens were sen-
tenced to death. 23 Even with such egregious facts, Chief Judge
Coleridge was not prepared to recognize imminent starvation as
a worthy coercive force to exculpate homicide. Indeed, no level
of force could ever justify or excuse a homicide. It is questiona-
ble, however, whether Chief Judge Coleridge would have been
able to satisfy the self-sacrifice he required of Dudley and Ste-
phens had he been the one floating at sea. Would a reasonable
person have been able die of starvation? The role of hero or
martyr is not a viable standard. It is not accessible to the ordi-
nary person. Indeed, it is an extraordinary act. Nonetheless, it is
required since a classic duress defense will never excuse when
the crime compelled is murder.
321. 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884). For an in depth discussion of the social and
legal climates in which this case was tried and from which the following factual
discussion was taken, see A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON
LAw (1984).
322. See SIMPSON, supra note 321, app. A.
323. Dudley's and Stephens' sentences were later commuted to six
months, but by extra-judicial means. Id. at 248 (Queen's pardon).
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B. Model Penal Code Duress
From the foregoing analysis of classic duress and its applica-
tion to the gang situation, it follows that the coerced recruit can-
not rely on its venerable shield. Within classic duress, gang and
gang membership crimes find almost insurmountable difficulty
with the immediacy, escape, and surrender elements. Addition-
ally, the duty to avoid placing oneself in the path of a coercive
force may also pose a problem. Although doubtfully with gang
members in mind, but, perhaps, cognizant of the cracks in these
elements, the American Law Institute crafted a much more leni-
ent version of duress. The Model Penal Code (MPG) provides a
slightly different standard of duress that mops up some of the
spillage from the more troubling classic elements.
The MPC section on duress provides that:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the
conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was
coerced to do so by the use of, or threat to use, unlawful
force against his person or the person of another, that a
person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have
been unable to resist.3 24
Although this framework seems quite similar to that of the classic
defense, comment to the section indicates that the only real
requirement is that the threat be objectively reasonable. That is,
the threat must be such that a reasonable person, in the actor's
situation, would have committed the commanded crime (i.e., the
coerced person acted no different than anyone else). 25 Indeed,
[b] eyond this limitation to coercive force or threats against
the person, no valid reason [is] perceived for demanding
that the threat be one of death or even of great bodily
harm, that the imperiled victim be the actor rather than
another or that the injury portended be immediate in
point of time.326
Thus, the MPC approach to duress has explicitly eliminated
the immediacy and deadly force requirements of classic duress.
In addition, the MPC defense is available for all crimes; it is not
324. MPC, supra note 1, § 2.09(1). Subsection (2) denies the defense if
the actor is reckless in placing himself in a likely coercive situation and provides
that negligence can destroy the defense as well, when negligence suffices to
establish culpability for the offense charged. Id. § 2.09(2). Subsection (3)
eliminates the defense for a woman acting on her husband's command. Id.
§ 2.09(3).
325. Id. § 2.09, explanatory note; Dressier, supra note 66, at 1344, 1362-
63.
326. MPC, supra note 1, § 2.09 cmt. 3, at 377.
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summarily denied in cases of homicide.32 7 The success of the
defense depends on the nature of the threat in comparison to
the crime committed,3 2 8 not on the satisfaction of several
elements.
Within this framework, duress is much more malleable and
capable of dividing the culpable from the coerced. By broaden-
ing the scope of those amenable to the defense and framing a
more realistic question for the trier of fact to decide, MPC duress
may more accurately reflect the culpability of the individuals
involved. In the gang context, in place of a rash condemnation
of all gang crime and gang members, at least the issue would be
presented to a fact finder that has had the opportunity to hear all
relevant evidence and make an informed, individual decision. 32 19
Unfortunately, MPC duress has not been particularly influ-
ential. Only six states have adopted duress standards substan-
tially similar to the MPC. 330 A few additional states have enacted
individual "reforms." Specifically, eight other states have aban-
doned the requirement that the harm threatened be death or
serious bodily injury.3 1 Six other states allow a duress defense in
cases of homicide.3 And, three other states have relaxed the
immediacy requirement.333 Except for Arkansas, Missouri, and
South Dakota, none of the states that have enacted anti-gang leg-
islation have also adopted any portion of the MPC defense.
Moreover, although jury instruction on the MPC standard
leaves room for individual tailoring, the language of the MPC
defense does not adequately address the environmental issues
involved in some gang coercion situations. Specifically, the lan-
guage of the MPC defense contemplates a particular person
bringing the coercive threat. MPC duress would not excuse
crime committed under the coercive forces of poor socioeco-
327. Id. ("It is obvious that even homicide may sometimes be the product
of coercion that is truly irresistible.
328. See id.
329. See Dressier, supra note 66, at 1345 ("IT]he MPC involves the jury
(assuming it is not waived) more deeply in the determination of the excuse
than is the case at common law.").
330. See Dor, supra note 229, at 719 & n.216, 720 & n.219, 721-22 &
n.227, app. (Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, NewJersey, and Pennsylvania).
For a generalized survey of what standards of duress different states employ, see
Dressier, supra note 66, at 1343-47.
331. See Dor6, supra note 229, at 719 & n.216, app. (Colorado,
Connecticut, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, Oregon, South Dakota, and Utah).
332. See id. at 720 & n.219, app. (Connecticut, New York, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, and Utah).
333. See id. at 721-22 & n.227, app. (Idaho, Kentucky, and South Dakota).
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nomic conditions or unreasonably dangerous communities. 33
4
Nevertheless, in the gang context, a valid coercive force may
result from the danger of the neighborhood or, once within a
gang, the danger of a rival gang. These situations, although legit-
imately coercive, might not find protection under MPC duress.
V. COERCED-GANG-MEMBER DEFENSE
The law becomes illegitimate when gaps exist between culpa-
bility and punishment.33 5 With the current, rigid application of
duress, this gap is more than apparent in certain circumstances.
Very real coercive threats exist in the gang context that are not
addressed by current law. These shortcomings in the application
of duress, however, are not shortcomings in the moral force
behind the excuse.
MPC duress may cope with some of the deficiencies of clas-
sic duress, but even the MPC standard leaves many issues in the
gang context unresolved. Specifically, the MPC does not recog-
nize the coercive environmental factors (i.e., unreasonably dan-
gerous neighborhoods) that may play on the recruit's resolve,
nor does it attempt to safeguard the martyrial nature of a gang
member's coercion plea. Although MPC duress casts a larger
net, in its crucial attempts to relax the immediacy and deadly
force prongs of classic duress it has not been very influential.
In defense of the duress excuse, the criminal street gang and
the communities that breed and perpetuate its growth could
never have been anticipated when duress began its venerable
career. Nevertheless, new situations and societies require new
law that more accurately and adequately redresses the problems
of the times. Although the law of duress is inadequate in the
gang context and, if it is to protect the coerced gang member,
must be reconsidered and remodeled, this Article does not pro-
pose to do that. The possibility of changing such an ancient
defense is slight. Furthermore, in its place, duress is effective. 36
Unfortunately, its place is not broad enough.
C. Ronald Huff aptly recognized the problem in failing to
recognize the situation in which some gang members find them-
selves: "If we, as a society, do not provide better social support
334. See Dressier, supra note 66, at 1367-68.
335. See generally supra Part III.
336. If a defendant can satisfy the necessary elements according to the
strict nature in which they have been applied, then punishment will be withheld
and, surely, will be unwarranted. Unfortunately, there are no reported cases of
successful duress defenses to highlight; the state cannot appeal from an
acquittal.
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and better access to the legal routes to success, we are ultimately
guilty of 'blaming the victims' when some of these young people
turn to gangs and crime to fulfill their needs."3" 7 This Article will
exploit the unique situation of the coerced gang member to fash-
ion a new coercion-based defense that will more precisely match
his culpability with his punishment. This new defense will allow
the level of punishment to more accurately reflect the moral cul-
pability of those who, as things now stand,'are doubly victimized
- first, by coercive gangs and/or neighborhoods and, second,
by the criminal justice system.
Not every gang member or every act of violence by an other-
wise eligible member should or will benefit from this defense.
The moral force necessitating the excuse requires a limitation on
the eligible class. Although classic duress is inadequate, perhaps
outdated, its elements provide an excellent model from which to
craft a more equitable coercion defense. In an effort to match
culpability with punishment or, in context, to avoid punishing
non-culpable gang members, a member's otherwise criminal acts
should not be punished when the following three elements are
met. First, the gang member did not join the gang by free
choice. Second, within the gang either force, credible threat of
force, or neighborhood exigencies precluded safe exit from the
gang's ranks. Third, the gang member had no reasonable oppor-
tunity to avoid the criminal act. And where these three elements
are not met sufficiently to exculpate, their partial satisfaction
should serve at least to mitigate a gang member's guilt.
Although these elements are similar to classic duress, their
proper application in the gang context will reveal significant
differences.
A. Required Elements
1. The Gang Member Did Not Join the Gang by Free Choice
Similar to the requirement of classic duress requiring that
the defendant not intentionally, recklessly, or negligently place
himself in the path of a likely coercive force, this first element of
the coerced-gang-member defense ensures that the coerced gang
member is a true victim of the gang and not a willing member
compelled to act against his wishes. Specifically, to satisfy this
element, the actor must have joined the gang either under legiti-
mate force or threat of force from within the gang or under rea-
sonably perceived needs for safety or protection.
337. Huff, supra note 9, at 34.
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The first class of relevant threats - from within the gang -
is likely the smaller, yet more compelling, category of this ele-
ment. The study of gang recruitment tactics is rudimentary,33 8
however, and documented cases of this type of recruitment are
few. Nevertheless, existing evidence argues that this category
does exist. The Cook County State's Attorney's Office estimated
that intimidation played a role in recruiting about twenty percent
of new gang members."3 9 Although this intimidation may
include the second recognized class of threats in this element,"4
there is reason to believe that part of this twenty percent is filled
by this first class of forced membership. For instance, in People v.
Cruz,34 1 the Ambros street gang would shoot its recruits to
encourage membership. The prosecution did not deny this tactic,
but, rather, adopted and argued it themselves. The Ambros' tac-
tic would support a defendant in proving this element; the situa-
tion, however, need not be so compelling.
With regards to the necessary force, any moderate level of
force would suffice. Although "moderate" is not particularly
descriptive, it is meant merely to signify that the force need not
be life threatening, but must be more than a minor inconven-
ience (e.g., a strong pinch on the back of the arm is not enough).
A force that a reasonable person would go to lengths to avoid is
perhaps the best description.
To suffice as a threat from the gang itself, the threat needs
to be legitimate and reasonably feared. Although particular
cases will flesh this out, the threat need, at least, be one that a
reasonable person would fear and one that is legitimately
believed will be carried out should the recruit notjoin. This test
is primarily objective and partially subjective. It is objective in
that the threat must be one that a reasonable person would fear.
It is subjective in that the particular defendant must personally
fear the threat. In this regard there is'no threshold level of sever-
ity that the threat must reach. Since membership in the gang,
not criminal activity, is the object, the threat is measured only by
the reasonableness by which it is feared. The test is also objective
in that the legitimacy of the threat (the likelihood that it will be
carried out) needs to be reasonably likely. And, it is again subjec-
tive in that the particular proponent of the coercion defense
needs to personally have believed in its legitimacy. A threat that
no one besides the defendant would have taken seriously or one
338. CONLY, supra note 5, at 19.
339. Id.
340. Reasonably perceived needs for safety and protection.
341. 518 N.E.2d 320, 321 (111. Ct. App. 1987), cert. denied, 526 N.E.2d 834
(IIl. 1988).
COERCION DEFENSE FOR THE STREET GANG CRIMINAL
that, although reasonable to fear and likely to occur, the defend-
ant did not take seriously simply will not suffice. Commentary to
MPC duress provides some useful insight into the selection of
these criteria. Specifically, legal standards of conduct cannot
depend on an individual's capacity to conform to the require-
ments of the law; the fact that the individual actor lacked the
fortitude to avoid the threatened harm without joining the gang
is important only to the extent that a reasonable person would
also be unable to do so.34 In sum, this element is satisfied when
the pressures of the circumstances, not merely the frailties of the
individual cause the defect.
The second class of "threats" that will satisfy this element are
reasonably 43 perceived needs for safety and protection. Stress on
the word "need" is significant. An increase in safety that can be
achieved by joining a gang will not suffice if other, more conven-
tional, means are available. The youth must have joined the
gang to avoid a serious and unreasonable danger that would
otherwise remain unaddressed. Within this class are those gang
members who reasonably fear their community and the pros-
pects of coping essentially alone in this hostile environment.
Within this class are those gang recruits who see their neighbor-
hood or their school as a dangerous place to be. Similarly within
this class are those recruits who see gang membership as a neces-
sary evil to getting to and surviving at school.?4 In such cases,
the gang member is not a member because he placed himself in
a dangerous situation, rather, he is a member because he was
otherwise unable to extricate himself from an unreasonably dan-
gerous environment.
Incorporated into this class is the further requirement that
joining the gang must subdue the incipient threats. No matter
how valid the actor's fears and protection needs, if the gang does
not quell these anxieties, then gang membership is not necessary
or effective to avoid the threat and will not satisfy this element.
Ajury may have some difficulty applying the objective com-
ponent of the test for this class of threats (i.e., deciding whether a
reasonable person would have felt a need to join the gang). The
gang environment is foreign to most potential jurors. Presenta-
tion of evidence regarding the pervasiveness of violence in the
community, however, should allow for a reasoned decision. Such
342. See MPC, supra note 1, § 2.09 cmt. 2.
343. Throughout the remainder of this Article, the words "reasonable"
and "legitimate," when used as standards to judge conduct, threats, or beliefs,
should be read to invoke the objective/subjective analysis described supra in the
text paragraph preceding this note.
344. See supra notes 75-80, 109-12 and accompanying text.
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evidence should be able to explain why gang membership may
provide greater protection from everyday threats than would liv-
ing outside the gang and relying on ordinary police protection.
Although gang membership also raises the specter of inter-
gang warfare and, thus, the potential for greater harm, the casu-
alties of these battles are not limited merely to gang members.
Often non-gang members and innocent bystanders are caught in
the violence. Thus, abstaining from gang membership is not cer-
tain to limit such threats. Furthermore, non members are on
their own in the battle. At least the gang member has the sup-
port of his gang. So long as a reasonable person sees the protec-
tive function of the gang (for this reason or another) and also
determines that this benefit is not sufficiently available from
more conventional means, this test is satisfied.
The purpose behind this second class of threats leading to
gang membership is to recognize situations where the gang
member has taken upon himself the responsibility for securing
his basic safety - safety that society should assure. This class
supplies a viable context for answering the essential question
posed by Justice Blackmun's dissent in United States v. Bailey:
"whether the prisoner should be punished for helping to extri-
cate himself from a situation where society has abdicated com-
pletely its basic responsibility for providing an environment free
of life-threatening conditions .... " The answer for purposes
of this first element is no. Although Justice Blackmun wrote in
the context of prison escape, the reasoning and the policy
behind his argument applies equally well to the gang controlled
neighborhood. Specifically, some gang members, through gang
membership, are helping to extricate themselves from the dan-
gers of the neighborhood and are affording themselves a level of
protection that most assume without thought but which society is
not providing in all locales. This inequality makes recognition of
such threats all the more compelling. Justice Blackmun may
agree: "The case for recognizing the duress or necessity defenses
is even more compelling when it is society, rather than private
actors, that creates the coercive conditions."'
An evaluation of threats will be required for all three ele-
ments to this defense. It is important to recognize, here and
throughout, that the gang member need not challenge the
threat so long as he has reason to believe it will be carried out.
Likewise, the threat need not be immediate in the sense of classic
345. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 424 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
346. Id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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duress; there is no temporal limitation. So long as the
threatened harm will proceed or is reasonably believed will pro-
ceed as a direct consequence of the member's action or inaction,
this element is satisfied. There is no sense in refusing to recog-
nize the coercive value of threats simply because they do not
hover over the unfortunate victim ever-ready to strike. If the
threat effectively deters or compels certain activities and is gener-
ally known to exist against a community or group, it may be coer-
cive. The Imperial Gangster Disciples are no less intimidating by
threatening the "eight-ball" 47 than they would be if they stood
over a gang member poised to inflict the beating. In the gang
context, where the coercion claim is legitimate, the gang mem-
ber has no escape. Therefore, whether the threatened harm will
result immediately or later that evening or week does not govern
the force of the threat. Time is an appropriate consideration
only in determining whether a result is reasonably certain to
occur. The greater the temporal gap the more difficult it will be
to prove the necessary consequence; establishing an inability to
avoid the harm may a pose higher hurdle.
Where legitimate cases of intimidating gang recruitment
exists the argument is strongest that the recruit lacks moral cul-
pability forjoining or, at least, that his gang affiliation should not
destroy an otherwise valid defense. Coercive-neighborhood
arguments are valid as well. In these situations, the legitimacy of
the criminal justice system requires some means for taking coer-
cive factors into account in adjudicating anti-gang statute viola-
tions, RICO prosecutions, and common law criminal violations.
Because there is a definite stigma and fear associated with gang
related crime, mere prosecutorial discretion is not enough.
Some state prosecutors are elected officials and the public, with-
out knowing all the facts surrounding individual defendants,
would likely be quite hostile to a prosecutor who dismissed cases
against admitted gang members. The very sentiment that fuels
the war on crime elects and reviews the prosecutor's office. Even
where this defense legitimately applies, a prosecutor is not in the
best place to terminate prosecution and should not be put in the
position of risking social censure for attempting to reach a just
result. Furthermore, the current trends in the prosecution of
gang cases indicates a desire to punish to the maximum
extent.3 4 The legitimacy of the coercion at play needs greater
347. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
348. Typically, experienced gang prosecutors and senior attorneys
prosecute gang cases, plea bargaining is rare, and the general policy is to seek
maximum penalties. CONLY, supra note 5, at 53-54.
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recognition to afford the appropriate protection. A jury that
hears all of the surrounding evidence would be much better
placed to apply even-handed justice to such a difficult situation.
2. Within the Gang Either Force, Credible Threat of Force,
or Neighborhood Exigencies Precluded Safe Exit
from the Gang's Ranks
Since the goal of this coerced-gang-member defense is to
protect the non-culpable gang member from punishment for his
gang membership and the involuntary crimes he commits while a
member of a gang, it follows that he must not have been able to
leave the gang at will. If the gang member is able to leave the
gang whenever he so desires, then, when confronted with a gang
directive to commit a crime or when the threat that caused his
initial membership subsides, his simple choice would be to quit.
If he cannot freely quit, if coercive forces restrict his exit, then
his continued gang involvement is understandable and it will sat-
isfy this element.
Force, threat of force, or neighborhood exigencies can all
supply the necessary pressure. With respect to the "force" or
"threat of force" classes of this element, the danger must ema-
nate from the gang itself. In terms of seriousness, the "eight-bal-
led" or "get violated" reprimands used by the Imperial Gangster
Disciples, in Helton v. State,"9 provide formidable examples of
possible activities that would satisfy the lower end of this element.
It is doubtful that these devices were life threatening, but so
much is not required. These threats surely were an objectively
reasonable deterrent to safe exit for Imperial Gangster Disciple
members. So long as an actual (moderate) 5 ° force was present
or the threats were legitimate and reasonably feared"'1 this ele-
ment is satisfied.
A second (or third) class of threats precluding safe exit rec-
ognizes the exigencies of community life as a possible coercive
force. This category is designed to recognize the difficult situa-
tion that a gang member faces when he leaves his gang. Accord-
ing to the real life testimony of five gang members from the
Cabrini Green Housing Project, there is very little opportunity to
349. 624 N.E.2d 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993). See supra notes 117-21 and
accompanying text.
350. For an explanation of the severity required of a "moderate" force,
see supra text paragraph following note 341.
351. For a discussion of the objective/subjective standard implicated
here, see supra note 342 and accompanying text.
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make a clean break from a gang.3 52 The threat from rival gang
members may never disappear. Rival gangs are often oblivious to
or unwilling to recognize a gang member's exit. Furthermore, if
the gang member originally joined due to reasonably perceived
needs for safety and protection, such threatening conditions may
take time to remedy.
If there were some way to escape the danger zone, perhaps
this class would lose its legitimacy. However, such means for
escape must be dealt with on an individual basis. For the typical
gang member the economics that left no alternative to joining
the gang (i.e., unable to move to less gang afflicted area) will not
likely subside while in the gang."' 3 This class of neighborhood
threats, like much of this defense, relieves the gang member
from the demands of self-sacrifice in the name of society. So
long as a reasonable person, cognizant of the threat posed by
rival gangs, would not feel safe outside the gang this element is
satisfied.
In some cases, gang members may naturally age out of their
gangs. Certainly, all members do not maintain their gang affilia-
tion and activity until death. Studies have suggested that gang
involvement tends to diminish as members reach adulthood.354
The average or natural point of this break is uncertain, however,
and it has been suggested that gang members are continuing
their gang involvement to a later age than has previously been
the case.3 5 Regardless of the validity of this assertion, those at
the margins of this natural separation remain equally endan-
gered, by rival gangs, as do members who separate in the "prime"
of their gang careers. Furthermore, recognizing that a member
may eventually age out of his gang involvement does not dimin-
ish his potential necessity for current safety and protection.
352. Panel Discussion, supra note 147. See also supra notes 147-49 and
accompanying text.
353. This is not always the case. Economic welfare can improve where
distributions from drug sales economically empowers the individual gang
members.
354. Lasley, supra note 19, at 434 (citing Horowitz, supra note 18; Huff,
supra note 5; Maxson & Klein, supra note 22; James F. Short, New Wine in Old
Bottles? Change and Continuity in American Gangs, in GANGS IN AMERICA, supra
note 18, at 223),
355. Lasley, supra note 19, at 434 (citing RurrH HoRowrrz, HONOR AND
THE AMERICAN DREAM (1982);JoAN W. MOORE, HOMEBOYS (1978);Jeffrey Fagan,
Social Processes of Delinquency and Drug Use Among Urban Gangs, in GANGS IN
AMERICA, supra note 18, at 183; James Diego Vigil, Cholos and Gangs: Culture
Change and Street Youth in Los Angeles, in GANGS IN AMERICA, supra note 18, at
116). Lasley's analysis of the aging of gangs failed to prove this aging
phenomenon statistically, however, it also did not disprove or dispute its
existence. Lasley, supra note 19, at 447.
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This element does not require that quitting the gang is cate-
gorically impossible. Rather, a gang member satisfies this ele-
ment when he has no objectively reasonable choice other than to
continue membership. The law should not require heroism; it
should be responsive to reality.
3. The Gang Member Had No Reasonable Opportunity to
Avoid the Criminal Act
The ultimate standard for this final element is well phrased
byJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Bailey: the defense will
fail if the gang member has a reasonable, legal opportunity to
avoid the criminal act and the harm.356 The moral import of this
element is obvious. If the youth could avoid gang membership
or criminal activity once within the gang and could also avoid the
penalty "compelling" such acts, then there is no overwhelming
coercive force and no coercion defense. On the other hand, if
refusing the criminal act would necessarily result in serious
harm, then the gang member is put to a choice for which he
should not be held criminally responsible. The volitional defect
required in the coerced-gang-member defense is similar to that
in classic duress; they are not identical, however.
When gang leadership orders an act done under penalty of
death or great bodily harm, 57 the gang member faces an unrea-
sonable choice. With this defense, however, unlike classic duress,
a well founded fear of death or serious bodily injury is not
required to excuse for all crimes. Instead, whether a particular
threat makes the choice to commit a specific crime unreasonable
depends on the nature of both the threat and the crime. For the
coerced-gang-member defendant, the necessary degree of harm
threatened depends on the severity of the crime committed.
Specifically, a lesser threat is sufficient to coerce and excuse a
lesser crime. 58 For serious crimes, such as murder or rape, per-
haps a threat of death would be required. However, for offenses
such as robbery or simple assault, a lesser harm would suffice. So
long as the defendant presents some evidence of a coercive
threat, it will be the jury's duty, as the conscience of society, to
decide its sufficiency in light of the crime committed.
356. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980).
357. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815, 817 (6th Cir.)
(defendant gang members were required to rob a bank under penalty of
death), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850 (1982); People v. Ganus, 594 N.E.2d 211, 214
(Ill. 1992) (defendant gang member was required to kill a fellow inmate under
penalty of death), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1055 (1993). See also supra notes 122-31
and accompanying text.
358. See also supra note 244.
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There is genuine debate as to whether classic duress should
ever excuse in cases of homicide. 59 There is a definite moral
imperative against killing another. Indeed, disabling the duress
defense for such a crime, Blackstone wrote: "[the coerced actor]
ought rather to die himself, than escape by the murder of an
innocent."36 0 It may, in fact, be more honorable to sacrifice
one's own life, however, the law should not require it. 61 So long
as the threat is sufficient, there is no reason to conclude that
homicide cannot be legitimately coerced. For example, the
imminent starvation present in Dudley and Stephens surely was suf-
ficient.3 62 If the alternative is, indeed, certain death, it is unduly
harsh for the law to demand self-sacrifice. Thus, no such limita-
tion shall accompany this new coercion defense.
As with the previous two elements, not only can the gang
affect the free will of individual members, but so can the commu-
nity. A gang member who refuses to act criminally may lose his
honor. Losing honor within the gang can lead to expulsion.363
If it is unreasonably dangerous to leave the gang it should be
equally unreasonably dangerous to be ousted. If the dangers of
community life preclude exit from the gang in the first place and
if refusing criminal gang enterprises would lead to exile from the
gang, then the gang member cannot reasonably refuse the act.
So long as the threat is legitimate and unreasonable, the moral
push behind the defense must protect these transgressions as
well. The jury will be able to decide what level of crime such
coercive forces may excuse.
Although the coerced-gang-member defense could apply to
smaller gangs, the stronger moral argument accompanies larger
organizations. The reason is pragmatic. For cases relying on
active gang influence, in order for the defense to apply, the gang
actor must prove that he was "controlled" by the gang, both in
joining and in acting according to the gang's wishes. The larger
and more powerful (and organized) the group, the greater con-
trol it should be able to exert over its domain and the less power
359. For a discussion of this topic, see generally Dressier, supra note 66, at
1367-74; Gerald A. Williams, Comment, Tully v. State of Oklahoma: Oklahoma
Recognizes Duress as a Defense for Felony-Murder, 41 OKLA. L. REV. 515 (1988). See
also Dor, supra note 229, app. (listing crimes for which individual state codes
declare the duress defense to be unavailable).
360. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 25, at *30.
361. See MPC, supra note 1, § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 375 ("The proper treatment
of the hero is not merely to withhold a social censure; it is to give him praise
and just reward.").
362. See supra notes 321-22 and accompanying text (defendants floating
at sea for seventeen days without food or water).
363. Kennedy & Baron, supra note 50, at 89-90.
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to change or resist will lie with mere members. Conversely, the
smaller the group, the less its manpower, and, arguably, the less
its controlling force in the greater community. This relationship
is true as well for coercive-neighborhood arguments, in which
the gang member must argue that the dangers attendant to living
in the community require some measure of gang protection. As
gang size and strength grows, so will ability to protect members
from neighborhood dangers. Likewise, size will be positively cor-
related with a particular gang's contribution to this sense of
danger.
Analyzing the merits of this defense from both moral and
policy perspectives, one cannot lose sight of the previous discus-
sion of gangs and influences to gang membership. Gang mem-
bers are not always, or even often, hardened criminals or callous
delinquents. Studies have shown that gang members are not nec-
essarily delinquent before they enter the gang, nor highly delin-
quent upon exit.364 Some gang members are merely scared or
disillusioned kids who live in highly dangerous communities.
For these gang members, friends (i.e., gangs) are the only viable
source of protection. The police department and the criminal
justice system do not operate to help these individuals. In fact,
with legislation that makes gang membership illegal, they oper-
ate to contain and convict all gang members. So when consider-
ing what is a reasonable fear or threat and what conduct is
unreasonably dangerous, it must not be forgotten that ordinary
means of protection and socialization are largely unavailable in
gang-infested neighborhoods. It must be remembered that in
this harsh environment rash words and ill-feelings often result in
action. Death threats and threats of serious injury are always
troublesome; they are even more troublesome when experience
has shown their legitimacy.
The satisfaction of the above three elements of this new
coerced-gang-member defense will help match the punishment
that a gang member receives for his gang related crimes with his
individual culpability for such acts. So long as all three elements
are satisfied, morality and justice argue for compassion; the gang
member should be excused.
B. Abandoning the All or Nothing Defense
Since we have shaken the constraints of classic duress, we are
not limited to its all-or-nothing exculpatory consequences. This
is enormously beneficial. It is possible that the limited success of
364. Thornberry et al., supra note 312, at 68-69. See also supra notes 312-
14 and accompanying text.
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classic duress defenses is partly attributable to this stark
dichotomy."5
Certainly, judges and juries have been wary of acquitting
confessed "criminals" simply because of the circumstances of
their crimes. This does not mean, however, that the judge or
jury believed that compassion was undeserved. Experience has
shown that, when the opportunity presents itself in difficult cases,
juries tend to reach compromise verdicts." 6' For example, in
borderline murder cases, ajury would rather find the defendant
guilty of manslaughter than convict for murder or acquit
entirely. The problem is that with most coercion defenses, the
opportunity to compromise is lacking.
The line between guilt and innocence in coercion cases is
not always concrete. The law should allow the judge or jury to
express this uncertainty in their verdict. As a mitigator, the
coerced-gang-member defense would allow the judge or jury to
recognize the forces at play on the defendant's free will, even if
they deemed the coercion insufficient to excuse.
Discussing classic duress in his opinion in Lynch v. Director of
Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland,67 Lord Edmund-Davies
considered the viability of duress as a mitigating factor. He
argued that allowing duress to function other than as a total
excuse would unduly restrict the number of defendants willing to
assert it as a defense. This concern was echoed by Ian Dennis in
his commentary on duress; applying duress as a mitigating factor
will reduce the number of defendants willing to assert it, because
they will necessarily have to admit to the crime without any real
possibility of acquittal. 68 This fear is, perhaps, best illustrated by
the dangers associated with inconsistent pleadings in coercion
cases.
Although inconsistent pleadings are permitted in criminal
law, when one such pleading is classic duress, this strategy is not
a realistic alternative. For a coerced actor, an inconsistent plead-
ing would require that he claim he was not guilty or, in the alter-
native, that he was coerced into committing the act. The
problem is in the presentation to the jury. Typically, a defendant
need not present any defense to the criminal charges against
365. But seeMINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(3) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting
a murder charge to be reduced to manslaughter when the homicide is the
product of coercion); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.46 (West Supp. 1995) (permitting
coercion defense to reduce first degree murder to second degree murder).
366. HARRY KALVEN,JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY 230, 263, 280,
405, 477 (1966).
367. 1975 AC. 707.
368. Ian Dennis, Developments in Duress, 51 J. CrM. L. 463, 472 (1987).
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him. Duress and the new coerced-gang-member defense are
both affirmative defenses, 69 however, and, as such, the defend-
ant would need to present evidence to support the required ele-
ments. During this presentation he would necessarily have to
admit that he committed the crime. The alternative nature of
the pleading would be impossible for the jury to maintain. So
long as the prosecution addresses every element of the charged
crime, the burden of persuasion is likely a foregone conclusion.
Removing the all-or-nothing gamble might, in fact, be detri-
mental to one who is partially responsible and, in such cases, may
discourage coercion pleas. Although duress or the coerced-gang-
member defense may be used less frequently if capable of miti-
gating as well as excusing, this is no argument against such
application.
The clean slate that accompanies the coerced-gang-member
defense affords the opportunity to incorporate a jury compro-
mise provision. In particular, gang membership, to the extent
coerced, should be a mitigating or exculpating factor depending
on its degree and pervasiveness. Allowing coercion to mitigate as
well as to exculpate is morally correct. If one objective of crimi-
nal law is to limit punishment by the degree of culpability pres-
ent, then the potential use of coercion as a mitigating factor can
only serve to facilitate this match. If one who commits a crime
absent any coercive force is more responsible than one who has
been threatened with harm should he refuse, then the two
should not be punished the same. However, if mitigation is not
permitted with a coercion defense and if a jury decides that the
threat was not sufficient to exculpate entirely, then the two crimi-
nal actors would be punished the same. Providing a sliding scale
of excuse would permit the appropriate distinction.
The freedom to use coercion as a mitigator is especially pru-
dent in the gang context, where public sentiment will surely limit
the jury's desire to acquit outright. Furthermore, allowing coer-
cion to mitigate as well as to exculpate will encourage defendants
whose coercion claims would doubtfully serve as a total excuse to
expose the underlying nature of their criminal activity. These
benefits outweigh the uncompelling fears articulated by Lord
Edmund-Davies and Dennis.
The sharp line between conviction and excuse that is drawn
by classic duress is unreasonable. Necessarily, there must exist
some point at which a threat insufficient to excuse becomes suffi-
cient. On one side of this line no punishment would be given.
369. For a further discussion of the evidentiary implications of affirmative
defenses, see infra notes 372-75 and accompanying text.
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On the other side, notions of deterrence would warrant full pun-
ishment with all the moral difficulties this entails."' 0 Also on this
side, the problems associated with reformation and rehabilitation
are left unchecked. 7 1 A retributive theory of punishment and a
defense which allowed the jury to determine, on a sliding scale,
exactly what conviction or sentence a defendant deserved would
help erase this line.
C. Logistical Considerations
1. Limiting the Influx of Coerced-Gang-Member Pleadings
Opening the door for the coerced-gang-member defense
also opens the door for satellite hearings on the poverty and dan-
gers of gang controlled neighborhoods and the tyranny of gang
leadership. Admittedly, allowing such a defense could divert
focus from the specific criminal act on trial and, on occasion,
would expend scarce judicial resources pursuing meritless tan-
gents. This is a necessary evil, however, whose effects will likely
be limited by the evidentiary requirements of affirmative
defenses in general and the sheer danger in implicating a gang.
As with other affirmative defenses, the burden of proof is
initially on the defendant to present evidence from which a rea-
sonable juror, who believed those facts, could find in his favor. 72
With classic duress, so long as the defendant makes a prima facie
case in support of the requisite elements, even if the evidence is
weak or of doubtful credibility, it should be given to the jury.7 3
Indeed, "[a] trial court commits reversible error in a criminal
case when it fails to give an adequate presentation of a theory of
defense." 74 The converse of this rule is also true. If the defend-
ant fails to allege appropriate facts the judge may preclude pres-
entation of any evidence on the subject and may refuse to give a
jury instruction on the matter.3 73 Furthermore, even if evidence
370. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
371. See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
372. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 415 (1980); Mathews v. United
States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).
373. See United States v. Newcomb, 6 F.3d 1129, 1138 (6th Cir. 1993).
374. United States v. Plummer, 789 F.2d 435, 438 (6th Cir. 1986).
375. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 416 ("If.. . an affirmative defense consists of
several elements and testimony supporting one element is insufficient to sustain
it even if believed, the trial court and jury need not be burdened with testimony
supporting other elements of the defense."); United States v. Campbell, 675
F.2d 815, 821 (6th Cir.) ("If evidence is introduced, but it is apparent that all of
the requirements of the coercion defense are not addressed, the trial court is
not obligated to allow the evidence to remain for consideration by the jury."),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850 (1982).
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is presented to the jury, the jury is well equipped to weed out
legitimate claims from mere self-serving stories. Dennis argues:
"Commonsense suggest[s] that where there are in fact no reason-
able grounds for holding a particular belief it will only be in
exceptional cases that a jury will conclude that such a belief was
or might have been held." 76
As with classic duress, raising the coerced-gang-member
defense would be risky. In doing so, the defendant admits the
criminal act, hoping to disprove his responsibility. The inherent
danger in urging this defense is manifest and is increased in the
gang context by the fact that the proponent must necessarily
implicate his gang and its leadership. As the distinctions
between street and prison gangs blur, pleading this defense will
raise definite safety issues for the defendant. If his fears are not
deemed reasonable or sufficient enough to excuse the crime at
trial, the basis for these fears will likely be much stronger after-
wards. Whether the defendant is sentenced to prison or allowed
on the street, the gang will have access to him.
Gangs pose a much greater retaliatory threat than smaller,
less organized criminals and conspiracies. In this respect, the
retaliatory implications of this defense should help it to police
itself. Due to the strength of the typical gang, this defense is
more self-policing than classic duress and there has been no
flood of classic duress defenses going to trial. It is reasonable to
conclude that the frivolous or doubtful coerced-gang-member
defense will rarely be offered.
Finally, so long as the moral basis for the coerced-gang-
member defense is valid, an increase in gang defendants seeking
its protection is not necessarily harmful. Although uncertainty
will necessarily accompany initial application of this defense,
such uncertainty is a natural consequence of any new rule of law
or the extension or contraction of existing law. As more cases
are tried and issues appealed, the defense will assume more defi-
nite limits. Any additional work this evolution may demand of
appellate courts is a positive and necessary consequence. Dis-
cussing a similar argument against the extension of duress to
cases of murder, Dennis observed, "If considerations of rational-
ity and fairness suggest the extension of a recognised defence to
one restricted class of cases to which it has not hitherto applied,
it surely cannot be an answer to these claims that we must expect
the defence to be used and tested."377 Indeed, Dennis captures
this argument quite well; if the defense is valid, society, in the
376. Dennis, supra note 368, at 478.
377. Id. at 468 (emphasis omitted).
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interest ofjustice, should encourage its employment and further
definition.
2. Protection: Creating an Incentive to Plead Coercion in
Legitimate Cases
The crux of the preceding self-policing argument is that
pleading the coerced-gang-member defense will pose definite
dangers to the gang member proponent. This is beneficial in
that it will discourage frivolous claims. The justification behind
the defense, however, requires that it be available in appropriate
circumstances and provide adequate relief when successful.
These legitimate users require some measure of protection, some
incentive to plead the defense. It is not enough to place them at
their own risk in offending and attacking the gang and its lead-
ers. Some protective program is necessary to remove the success-
ful coerced-gang-member defendant from the oppressive
environment that led him to gang membership and criminal
prosecution.
If no provisions are made for the successful defendant, he
will return to the hostile environment that gave rise to the
defense in the first place. The difference, now, is that his
"friends" may well have turned to enemies - a highly organized,
highly dangerous group of enemies. 37 1 There is no other escape
for the successful coerced-gang-member defendant. The fact
that he is economically unable to remove himself from the com-
munity is a given; without this lack of mobility the defense must
fail.179 In this regard, the mobility sufficient to destroy this
defense is not established by access to cars or public transporta-
378. Gang retaliation against witnesses in gang prosecutions and even
against gang prosecutors has become commonplace and certainly is an
important consideration for anyone who would challenge or implicate the gang
in court. See Crime Control Priorities, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
Feb. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Congressional Testimony File
(statement of Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator Drug Enforcement
Administration) (in prosecution of violent crack cocaine gang eleven witnesses
were fatally shot and the home of another was set on fire); John Gillie, Threats
Against Witnesses Lead to Mistrial in Gang Slaying, NEWS TRIB., Dec. 8, 1995, at B1
("[Defendant] told his attorney they were sure to win because the prosecution's
main witnesses would not be testifying because they had been threatened.");
Kevin Cullen & Shelley Murphy, Account of Killing Hints Prosecutor was Targeted,
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1995, at 1 (investigators found no evidence to explain
the murder of a gang prosecutor except for his recent appointment to
prosecute cases involving some of Boston's most violent gangs).
379. If the coerced-gang-member defendant had the means to leave the
coercive community or group then he would not be able to satisfy the
requirement that some force or threat of force prevented his safe exit from the
gang. See supra notes 349-55 and accompanying text.
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tion. Although these vehicles allow a gang member to travel to
different areas, this reprieve is only short term. Long term
escape is not obtainable without the ability to change residence.
The successful defendant may avoid conviction and incarcera-
tion, but without some post-acquittal protection he will not likely
avoid punishment. The incentive to plead this defense is lacking.
Society must assure some level of safety to the successful
coerced-gang-member defendant, especially since a successful
defense acknowledges that society has previously failed its duty to
protect. Due to the community nature of the gang problem,
relocation may be the only effective solution.3"' In theory, dif-
fusing the danger posed by the gang is another possibility. In
practice, however, this is not a viable alternative. The inability of
the police to contain the gang is obvious from the presence of
coercive gang control in the first place. A third alternative is to
proactively dismantle and destroy the gang.3 8' This is a long
term remedy, however, which, although badly needed, will not
help currently oppressed and coerced gang members.
If gang membership is coerced and if criminal activity within
this gang is not freely chosen, then society does not profit either
by incarcerating the defendant or by returning him to his previ-
ous community. Both non-relocation alternatives are morally
unsound; we are either punishing beyond culpability or
returning coerced defendants to the coercive, or worse, forces
that compelled the crime. Since both relocation and incarcera-
tion require resources, it seems much wiser to apply these
resources toward future development than toward illegitimate
attempts at reformation, rehabilitation, deterrence, and retribu-
tion. Relocating successful coerced-gang-member defendants
will be expensive, but so is incarcerating legitimately coerced
defendants who are afraid to implicate the gang.
Relocating successful coerced-gang-member defendants also
limits the potential for gang leaders to abuse this defense. If a
coerced gang member is acquitted and returned to his neighbor-
hood unpunished, this would send a message to the gang that
this member could operate with impunity.382 An alternative to
380. A similar strategy of relocation is already used for some witnesses
who testify against gangs in gang prosecutions. See CoNv, supra note 5, at 54
(gang victims who are to testify against the gang are frequently relocated for
their protection). Relocation may also include the defendant's family, since the
strength of family bonds may provide an object for gang retaliation.
381. See infra notes 385-95 and accompanying text.
382. This was the worry of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in his opinion in
Lynch v. Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, 1 All E.R. 913 (1975),
where he wondered, "Would it not enable a gang leader of notorious violence
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revenge against the "turn-coat" gang member, the gang could
snatch him back into its folds and compel him to commit further
crime. The success of this member's coercion defense depended
on his inability to avoid the gang and the crime; it is foolish to
assume that if acquitted and returned to the community, the
same overwhelming threats would not exist. In fact, sending the
successful defendant back into his community may encourage
gangs to commit crime mainly through coerced members. 3
Gangs already similarly exploit the differences between the juve-
nile and adult court systems and have extensively used underage
members to take advantage of more lenient penalties in the juve-
nile system. 8 4
Gang members need an incentive to plead the coerced-
gang-member defense. From both moral and policy perspec-
tives, society should enable the successful defendant to "escape"
to a more hospitable neighborhood. Indeed, by hypothesis, soci-
ety's own failure to provide basic human protections may have
caused the problem to begin with. Although it may seem overly
generous to provide gang members with a defense to admitted
crime and a tax payer sponsored ticket to a new community, soci-
ety will benefit, in the long run, by providing such assistance.
The money is spent either way. In the long run, development is a
wiser investment than incarceration.
VI. How To COMBAT GANGS: PROACTIVELY ELIMINATING
THE PROBLEM
The coerced-gang-member defense is a band-aid. The root
of the problem, the reasons why teens join gangs, must be
addressed and eliminated. Cities have been slow to react and to
implement effective programs to combat gangs. Significant to
this tardiness is a political desire not to recognize a gang prob-
lem.3 8 So long as a city or region does not recognize that it has
a gang problem it cannot begin to address it. Indeed, this denial
has facilitated gang operations and has allowed gangs to gain
strong holds in many, many communities and schools.
3 8 6
to confer on his organisation by terrorism immunity from the criminal law? ...
A sane system of criminal justice does not permit a subject to set up a
countervailing system of sanctions or terrorism to confer criminal immunity on
his gang." Id.383. A limitation on this technique, or course, is the potential for
criminal liability that would accompany the coercion of another.
384. JANKowSKi, supra note 50, at 266.
385. See Huff, supra note 5, at 530.
386. Id.
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C. Ronald Huff, in his study on gangs, implicated public
schools as primary gang power bases.38 7 This conclusion has not
been directly contested nor dissected. Although most research-
ers cite decreased educational achievement as a significant impe-
tus to gang involvement, few question the cause-effect
relationship involved. The typical analysis is that a poor student
or truant will be led to the gang because he has no other legiti-
mate opportunities. If, however, the gangs "control" the schools
and make education difficult to attain and the school even diffi-
cult to reach in many instances, is the gang merely collecting the
educational system's refuse or is the gang creating it? The
answer probably falls both ways, however, most efforts to limit
gang membership, at least, unconsciously acknowledge the for-
mer response.
It is important to rebuke gangs. They should not be allowed
to operate with impunity, but from a systemic perspective, gangs
are operating with impunity today; indeed, membership steadily
rises as does associated crime. Currently, much emphasis is
being placed on reversing this trend.
Anti-gang legislation seeks to reverse this trend by incarcer-
ating the gang. This sort of legislation is reactive and, in certain
applications, illegitimate. Moreover, current anti-gang laws are
not even effective in their own limited scope. Prisons have not
been effective institutions for dismantling gangs. In fact, quite
the opposite is true. Furthermore, anti-gang statutes cut too
broadly and may further punish gang members that, simply, are
not culpable. This is morally unsound. Gangs need to be elimi-
nated, but anti-gang legislation is not the answer. According to
G. David Curry and Irving A. Spergel, both community develop-
ment and increased social opportunity, together with appropri-
ate sanctions, will more effectively combat the gang problem
than will mere blanket incapacitation. 88
In general, quick fix measures aimed at criminalizing and
detaining all gang members have been criticized, by those study-
ing the formation and activities of gangs, as shortsighted, unin-
formed, and often fueled by political reelection goals.38 9 Huff
explains this position:
Youth gangs are not "the problem." Rather, they are one
symptom of more fundamental, underlying socioeconomic
387. Id. at 532, 535. See also Thompson & Jason, supra note 5, at 324.
388. Curry & Spergel, supra note 11, at 401.
389. Huff, supra note 9, at 32. See generally CONLY, supra note 5, at 27-60
(discussing the various community and educational programs that have been
successful in helping to reduce the influence and destruction of gangs).
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problems - problems with both macrolevel components
(e.g., structural unemployment and children living in pov-
erty) and microlevel components (e.g., racism and its daily
social/psychological effects). The opinion that youth
gangs and their members are the problem and that the
answer lies in simply arresting gang members, convicting
them, and locking them up is a view that is futile and that
has now been rejected even by most law enforcement
leaders.3 90
At the local level, many communities have made great
strides toward curbing gang violence and gang membership.
Most of these programs are school- and community-based and
attempt to even the balance of power between gangs and more
legitimate forms of association.39 1 These programs attempt to
create alternative, positive environments where gangs previously
controlled and may be effective diversions for those not yet in the
gangs. 392 This still leaves the entrenched, yet coerced, gang
member.
Although in the infancy of evaluation, there are numerous
programs focusing on communities, schools, job training and
placement, and families that have achieved considerable success.
These programs focus primarily on younger or peripheral gang
members or youths at risk of joining gangs.39 3 These programs
need to be expanded to include older and more entrenched
gang members. Those who have already joined gangs fall outside
most existing programs and do not benefit from them at all. 94
In place of community and governmental encouragement, older
gang members are frequently subjected to harsher punishment
at the hands of the law.3 95 The coerced-gang-member defense
addresses the problems some of these individuals face and fills
the moral gap in existing law that otherwise leaves them victims.
390. Huff, supra note 9, at 32. See also CONLY, supra note 5, at 46("[Wihen [punishment] efforts have been implemented without community
support or initiatives that improve opportunities for gang youth and
prospective gang members to participate in non-criminal ventures, they have
largely fallen short of their goals.").
391. Examples of such programs include: midnight basketball leagues
and youth outreach programs which provide positive channels for after school
activities. For more examples, see generally Glick, supra note 113, at 97;
Mendez, supra note 20, at 76-77; Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation, Youth
Investment and Community Reconstruction: Street Lessons on Drugs and Crime, 5
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 504 (1991).
392. See Huff, supra note 5, 'at 534.
393. See CONLY, supra note 5, at 27-45.
394. See id. at 45.
395. Id. at 58. See also supra note 348.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Some street gangs instill danger and terror in their host
communities. Some street gangs acquire members under threat
of physical retaliation. Some street gangs simply feed off of the
insecurity and fear they help create. Some youths join these
gangs and obey the gang leadership because they fear for their
lives; they are afraid of both the gang and the community that
they live in. Indeed, some youths may have the same legitimate
fears about gangs that influenced the anti-gang legislation found
in many states. For some youths, however, social circumstances
have required an alternative response to the gang problem.
Accountability plays an important role in criminal law.
Morality plays an equally important role. If moral culpability is
lacking, the actor should not be punished; notions of accounta-
bility cannot override this premise. This holds true no matter
how repulsive the act or the actor. It is the responsibility and
function of criminal law to fashion punishment so as not to
exceed an individual's criminal culpability. Toward this end, as
social and environmental conditions change, we must be willing
and able to explore the margins of moral responsibility and
existing law.
Justice demands thatjuries be allowed to examine the moral
culpability of individual gang members in light of the exigencies
of gang life and gang controlled communities. Current duress
law does not allow for this. Duress has functioned adequately as
an excuse for quite some time, now it needs some help. The
coerced-gang-member defense proposed here would allow a
judge and ajury to investigate and assess the individual culpabil-
ity of the gang actor and to take into account the strength and
leadership policy of the coercive gang, the gang member's pos-
sibilities for escape, and the safety of the surrounding commu-
nity. The coerced-gang-member defense is not an open door
through which crimihals can run out. Rather, it provides a rea-
sonable hurdle that can strengthen the moral community by
more accurately relating punishment to culpability.
Certainly gang members are not poster children for criminal
excuse. They often are children, though, and they often have
grown up in environments that deserve special attention and
consideration. Society surely benefits by giving an involuntary
gang member a legitimate chance at independence in a non-
coercive environment. We must not forget that in the war
against crime, excepting a few RICO prosecutions, sanctions are
applied against individual gang members, not against the gang.
